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I. Non-Operator v. Operator and Other Oil 
and Gas Operations-Related Cases 
A. Court resolves dispute over interpretation of Participation Agreement, 
with a preprinted AAPL Model Form Operating Agreement attached as an 
exhibit, regarding which party was entitled under the contract to be the 
Operator of the wells.  
The recent decision in U.S. Energy Development Corp. v. Stephens 
Energy Group, LLC,1 arose out of a Participation Agreement (PA) entered 
into in April 2011 by Slawson Exploration Company, Inc., U.S. Energy 
Development Corporation and Osage Exploration and Development, Inc. 
covering a project area or field of oil and gas leases and wells. A number of 
third party working interest owners held interests of varying sizes in those 
wells, but those other owners did not sign, and were not subject to, the PA 
that had only been agreed to by the aforementioned three substantial owners 
in the project area. 
As between the three parties to the PA, their respective approximate 
interests in the properties covered by the PA was: Slawson – 45%; U.S. 
Energy - 30%; and Osage – 25%. The PA provided that Slawson would be 
the operator of all wells. Attached as an exhibit to the PA was an unsigned 
AAPL Model Form 610 – 1989 Operating Agreement. The PA provided 
that “[w]here there is a conflict between the Operating Agreement and [the 
PA, the PA] will control.” The PA also recognized the right of each of the 
parties to “assign their rights, duties, and obligations hereunder, so long as 
any assignment by a Party hereto is expressly made subject to the terms and 
conditions herein contained.”2 The preprinted form Operating Agreement 
attached as an exhibit to the PA named Slawson as Operator, in accordance 
with the express provision of the PA. The Operating Agreement also 
included provisions for the Operator’s resignation or removal, and for the 
selection of a successor Operator.  
Slawson had also been named as the Operator of some 30 wells under 
Oklahoma Corporation Commission force pooling orders which, in 
Oklahoma, provide a separate source of operator rights, apart from any 
private contract such as the Participation Agreement at issue in this case, or 
a stand-alone Operating Agreement. The Commission’s pooling order was 
                                                                                                                 
 1. No. 15-6188, 2016 WL 5210888 (10th Cir. Sep. 21, 2016) (Petition for Rehearing 
pending as of the time this paper was submitted for distribution). The District Court decision 
that was reversed by the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals may be found at No. CIV-14-1319-C, 
2015 WL 5031920 (W.D. Okla. Aug. 25, 2015). 
 2. U.S. Energy Development, 2016 WL 5210888 at *1. 
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effective as to the working interest owners in the subject wells who were 
not parties to the PA. 
In July 2014, Slawson entered into a Purchase and Sale Agreement 
(PSA) under which it sold most of its rights, titles and interests in the 
project area to Stephens. Slawson agreed to transfer possession and 
physical operation of the assigned properties to Stephens as part of the 
closing, but did not warrant that operations could be transferred to 
Stephens. The PSA provided that “transfers of operations will be subject to 
all necessary regulatory and third-party approvals” and that Slawson would 
“use its commercially reasonable efforts to assist [Stephens] in becoming 
successor operator.”3 Slawson subsequently delivered to Stephens 
assignments of its working interest in the subject units and wells, and filed 
the appropriate form with the Oklahoma Corporation Commission showing 
that it was transferring well operations to Stephens. Stephens promptly filed 
applications with the Commission to be named the successor operator under 
the Commissions prior force pooling orders. 
Relying on the provisions of the Operating Agreement exhibit to the PA, 
rather than the above-referenced assignability clause of the PA, Osage 
asserted that Slawson and resigned as operator under the PA and had also 
ceased to be operator under the PA by virtue of assigning all of its working 
interest rights in the lands covered by the PA to Stephens. Osage and U.S. 
Energy conducted a purported new operator election and voted Osage as the 
successor operator under the PA.  
Stephens, denied the position of Osage and U.S. Energy and asserted that 
the express wording in the PA that gave Slawson the right to operate all 
wells under the PA, and to assign its rights under the PA to another party 
(Stephens in this instance), controlled over the conflicting provisions of the 
Operating Agreement exhibit that were cited by Osage. 
Osage and U.S. Energy then sued Stephens for a judicial declaration that 
Osage was the valid successor operator and enjoining Stephens from 
continuing to possess the wells under its claim of operatorship under the 
provisions of the three-party PA (with the Commission having not yet 
decided who should be the successor operator under the Commission’s 
pooling orders). The District Court found that the operator election and 
succession provisions of the Operating Agreement attached as an exhibit to 
the PA were controlling and found that Osage was the valid successor 
operator to Slawson under the PA. Stephens appealed. 
                                                                                                                 
 3. Id. at *2. 
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The 10th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the District 
Court. The 10th Circuit found that “Oklahoma law presumes that contractual 
rights and duties are assignable, unless the parties provide otherwise in their 
agreement, or unless the duty is so specialized that the identity of the 
performing party is material to the contract.”4 The court found that Osage 
and U.S. Energy failed to show that either exception applied here. The court 
also rejected the appellees’ assertion that the term “Operator” has a special 
meaning in the oil and gas industry that excludes it from the general 
presumption that contractual rights and duties are freely assignable.5 
B. “Frac hit” lawsuit brought by Operator of well allegedly damaged by 
the frac job conducted on a neighboring horizontal well was dismissed on 
grounds of improper venue. 
In A. B. Still Wel-Service, Inc. v. Antinum Midcon I, LLC,6 the operator 
of a vertical well sued the operator and non-operators of the nearby Eggers 
horizontal well. The plaintiff Still alleged that the frac job conducted on the 
Eggers well caused damage to the Still’s well. The plaintiff asserted claims 
for alleged negligence, trespass, nuisance, conversion of hydrocarbons and 
unjust enrichment. The lawsuit was filed in the county where the plaintiff 
corporation was located. The trial granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss 
due to improper venue, finding that this suit was an action for “damages to 
land, crops or improvements thereon” within the meaning of 12 O.S. § 
131(2), and that the lawsuit must instead be filed in the county where the 
plaintiff’s land and well were located. The plaintiff appealed. 
The Oklahoma Court of Appeals affirmed. It found that the present 
action alleged damage to land, that the related claims of injury to 
contractual rights and loss of production depended upon whether plaintiff 
could show that the defendants damaged the land, and that this suit was 
properly dismissed pursuant to Section 131(2). 
C. Court addresses claims against the Railroad Commission for negligence 
and breach of contract for mistakenly plugging an abandoned offshore well 
that the Commission had agreed to postpone plugging. 
In Railroad Commission of Texas v. Gulf Energy Exploration 
Corporation,7 the Commission had issued orders requiring American 
                                                                                                                 
 4. Id. at *5. 
 5. Id. at *6. 
 6. ___ P.3d ___ (Okla. App. 2015 - #113755) (For Publication) (Petition for Certiorari 
Pending at the time of the submission of this paper). 
 7. 482 S.W.3d 559 (Tex. 2016). 
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Coastal Enterprises (ACE) to plug a number of inactive offshore wells the 
company operated in the Gulf of Mexico. ACE did not have sufficient 
assets to carry out the orders, and the company declared bankruptcy in May 
2008. So, the Commission took over the plugging responsibility. On April 
24, 2008, the Commission awarded Superior Energy Services a contract to 
plug 8 of the ACE wells, including the two wells at issue in this case 
identified as the 707S-5 and 708S-5 wells. 
However, at the time the plugging order issued, Gulf Energy Exploration 
Corporation was the lessee of the offshore area that included the 708S-5 
well, having acquired the lease from the General Land Office in 2007. On 
May 19, 2008, representatives of Gulf Energy, ACE and the Railroad 
Commission met and reached an oral agreement that the Commission 
would delay plugging 4 of the remaining wells covered by the plugging 
order, including the 708S-5. A formal settlement agreement was signed by 
the Commission on June 6, 2008. The bankruptcy court approved the 
settlement.  
In September 2008, the Commission issued several orders superseding 
the plugging orders on the wells covered by the Settlement Agreement and 
approving Gulf Energy’s request for a transfer of operations. 
A few months later, Gulf Energy discovered that the 708S-5 well had 
been plugged. In fact, it was determined that the well had been plugged on 
May 25, 2008, under the mistaken belief that the well being plugged was 
instead the 707S-5 well. The mistake originated with an admitted clerical 
error by Commission staff who inadvertently transposed the coordinates for 
the locations of several wells, resulting in the 708S-5’s aerial photograph 
and coordinates being labeled as those of the 707S-5 well, and vice versa. 
The mislabeled data was provided to the contractor hired to plug the wells.  
After discovering that the 708S-5 well had been mistakenly plugged, 
Gulf Energy sought and obtained permission from the legislature to sue the 
Railroad Commission for no more than $2.5 million in damages. The 
legislative consent and resolution did not waive the Commission’s 
immunity from liability, nor did it waive any defense of law or fact except 
for the defense of immunity from suit without legislative permission.  
Gulf Energy asserted negligence and breach of contract claims against 
the Commission and Superior, the contractor that plugged the well. Gulf 
included assertions that the crew members, including a Railroad 
Commission representative on board, ignored obvious indicators that they 
were at the wrong well when they mistakenly plugged the 708S-5 well. All 
claims were submitted to the jury. Superior settled with Gulf while the jury 
was deliberating.  
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2017
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The jury found that the Commission failed to comply with its agreement 
to postpone the plugging and abandonment of the 708S-5 well and that the 
Commission’s negligence proximately caused Gulf Energy’s damages. On 
the negligence claim, the jury attributed 65% of the responsibility to 
Superior and 35% to the Commission. The Commission appealed. The 
Texas Court of Appeals affirmed.8 
The Texas Supreme Court reversed.9 In reversing the judgment in favor 
of Gulf Energy, the Texas Supreme Court engaged in a detailed analysis 
that focused in primary part on two key issues. First, the court found that 
the trial court erred in the failure to include in the jury charge a question on 
the “good faith” defense of the Commission under Natural Resources Code 
section 89.045.10 
Second, the court found that the trial court erred in failing to include in 
the jury charge a question on contract formation, based on the 
Commission’s assertion that a fact issue existed on whether the parties had 
reached a meeting of the minds on the date (May 25, 2008) when the 
contract was alleged to have been breached by the plugging of the well.11 
The trial court overruled the Commission’s objection to the omission of that 
issue in the jury charge and ruled that a contract between the Commission 
and Gulf Energy was formed as a matter of law before the well was 
plugged. The trial court, in effect, held that the parties had a binding 
contract when they reached the oral agreement at the meeting on May 19, 
2008, and not when they signed the written Settlement Agreement three 
weeks later on June 9, after the well was plugged. 
The judgment below was reversed and the case was remanded for a new 
trial.12 
II. Royalty Owner Litigation 
A. Pending Oklahoma appeal might significantly clarify the status of 
Oklahoma gas royalty law regarding the scope of post-wellhead expenses 
that may be factored into royalty payments. 
In the original appeal in Pummill v. Hancock Exploration LLC,13 the 
defendants sought to reverse the District Court’s entry of some 40 pages of 
                                                                                                                 
 8. R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Gulf Energy Expl. Corp., 480 S.W.3d 570 (Tex. App. 2014). 
 9. R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Gulf Energy Expl. Corp., 482 S.W.3d 559, 576 (Tex. 2016). 
 10. Id. at 575-76. 
 11. Id. at 572-76. 
 12. Id. at 576. 
 13. No. 111,096, Oklahoma Supreme Court (appeal initiated September 27, 2012). 
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orders granting summary judgment in favor of the Pummill plaintiffs on 
certain issues associated with the allegations of improper deductions and 
royalty underpayments. The Oklahoma Supreme Court, in assessing 
whether to grant certiorari review with regard to the Court of Appeals’ 
affirmation of the summary judgment rulings, described the 3 key summary 
judgment issues as follows: 
“Issue 1: The express language of their leases does not abrogate 
or negate the implied covenant to market in any way; 
“Issue 2: The current or future use of POP [Percentage of 
Proceeds], POI [Percentage of Index] or any other form of 
contract, instead of a fee based agreement with Enogex, does not 
change the amount of royalties due under the leases; 
“Issue 3: Appellants are entitled to receive royalties on gas used 
off the lease or in the manufacture of products at the gas plant.14 
As to those three issues, the Court found that “facts which could affect the 
resolution of [Issues 1, 2 and 3 that] need to be addressed before the fact-
finder, the district court.” As a result, the Supreme Court reversed the 
opinion of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial court’s rulings in favor 
of the plaintiff on the above issues. The Pummill case was remanded to the 
District Court “with instructions to hear and decide the disputed fact 
issues.”  
A 3-day bench trial was subsequently conducted before the District 
Court in October 2015. In January 2016, the District Court issued a 74-page 
decision that in large part rules in favor of the Pummill plaintiffs. An appeal 
of that ruling was filed by the defendants in February 2016. Multiple 
amicus curiae participants were allowed to file briefs. The briefing of the 
issues on appeal was completed in August 2016, and the parties and the 
industry are awaiting the Oklahoma Court of Appeals’ decision. 
The Pummill case, given its prior long procedural history, appears to 
provide the best opportunity for litigants to reach the Oklahoma Supreme 
Court for the purpose of obtaining the much-needed clarification of the 
status of royalty law in Oklahoma under the 1998 landmark decision in 
Mittelstaedt v. Santa Fe Minerals, Inc.,15 in which many rulings regarding 
the deductibility of post-wellhead costs from royalty payments were made 
                                                                                                                 
 14. Order reversing in primary part and affirming in part, issued by the Oklahoma 
Supreme Court on November 17, 2014. 
 15. 954 P.2d 1203 (Okla. 1998). 
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by the Oklahoma Supreme Court. However, a number of key issues were 
left unresolved.  
B. Appellate Court reverses District Court order certifying a royalty owner 
class. 
On November 24, 2015, the Oklahoma Court of Appeals in Tipton 
Home, Trustees v. Burlington Resources Oil & Gas Company, L.P.,16 
reversed an order certifying a class of over 500 royalty and overriding 
royalty owners in some 22 wells located in 3 Oklahoma counties. The 
plaintiffs alleged that the defendant paid royalties based on non-arm’s 
length sales to an affiliate, and based on the weighted average price 
received for the affiliate sales. The plaintiffs further alleged that Burlington 
improperly deducted, in the computation of royalty payments, costs for 
gathering, compression, dehydration, treatment and processing (GCDTP 
costs) and fuel use, and failed to disclose those deductions on its check 
stubs.  
In reversing the class certification order, the Court of Appeals found that 
the proposed class did not satisfy the commonality and predominance 
requirements under 12 O.S. § 2023. Among other findings, the court held 
that individual issues predominated over common issues. The court 
observed that the question of where and when particular gas is 
“marketable” is not settled in Oklahoma, and there is no categorical rule in 
the state with respect to when post-production costs may be considered for 
royalty valuation. The court also held that the mere raising of a common 
question does not automatically satisfy § 2023(A)(2)’s commonality 
requirement. . . Instead, the common contention “must be of such a nature 
that it is capable of classwide resolution—which means that determination 
of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of 
each one of the claims in one stroke.” . . . “What matters to class 
certification . . . [is] the capacity of a classwide proceeding to generate 
common answers apt to drive the resolution of the litigation.” 
C. District Court denies request for certification of statewide class. 
The decision on class certification in McKnight v. Linn Operating, Inc.17 
was the first Oklahoma Federal District Court ruling on the question of 
class certification of royalty owner lawsuits in the aftermath of the 
important guidance provided by the United States Court of Appeals for the 
                                                                                                                 
 16. 86 O.B.J. 2540 (Okla. App. 2015 - # 111,735) (Not for Publication). 
 17. No. CIV-10-30-R, 2016 WL 756541 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 25, 2016). 
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10th Circuit in its rulings in July 2013 in two appeals that were pursued by 
XTO Energy, Inc.18 In both of those prior appeals, the 10th Circuit granted 
XTO’s request for a reversal of the District Courts’ orders granting class 
certification, with directions to conduct new evidentiary hearings in 
accordance with the rulings and directives of the 10th Circuit. 
The plaintiff royalty owners in McKnight sued the Linn defendants 
alleging that royalties had been underpaid, with the primary focus of the 
lawsuit being on the factoring of post-production costs into the computation 
of royalty payments. The McKnight case was filed by the plaintiffs in 
November 2009 seeking certification of a royalty owner class relating to 
certain Oklahoma wells of the Linn defendants. The Plaintiff’s Motion for 
Class Certification was heard by the District Court in February 2016. 
McKnight sought certification of a statewide class. 
The lengthy and complex “class definition” that the McKnights 
ultimately proposed to the Court occupies two pages of text in the District 
Court’s order of February 25, 2016. The class requested would have 
included 1,693 wells in the state of Oklahoma, over 30,000 putative class 
members and some 34,000 oil and gas leases. 
Certain of the key observations and rulings of the Federal District Court 
in the McKnight case were as follows: 
Early in its ruling, the District Court described its general perception of 
the underlying transactional relationship between oil and gas producers and 
midstream companies—using words that many in the oil and gas industry 
would take exception to (as did the Linn defendants) in certain respects—
by stating as follows: “Producers, like the [Linn] Defendants herein, often 
enter into contracts with midstream companies which process the gas under 
either percentage of proceeds (‘POP’), fee or keep-whole contracts. 
Typically, these contracts allow the midstream companies to acquire title or 
possession of the unprocessed and therefore unmarketable gas at the 
wellhead or somewhere upstream of the midstream company’s processing 
facilities and producers then declare that a ‘wellhead sale’ has occurred and 
contend that the raw gas is ‘marketable’ at the wellhead. This is an attempt 
to seemingly comply with the implied duty to market. However, the 
midstream companies provide the services of gathering, compressing, 
dehydrating, treatment and processing (‘GCDTP’) the gas and then 
                                                                                                                 
 18. Chieftain Royalty Company v. XTO Energy, Inc., 528 F. Appx. 938 (10th Cir. July 
9, 2013), applying Oklahoma oil and gas law, and Wallace B. Roderick Revocable Living 
Trust v. XTO Energy, Inc., 725 F.3d 1213 (10th Cir. 2013), applying Kansas oil and gas law. 
The 10th Circuit Court of Appeals essentially treated those two cases as companion appeals 
and decided the appeals through separate decisions issued the same date.  
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remitting to the producer either a percentage of what the midstream 
company receives from the purchaser (POP) or the amount received from 
the pipeline minus a fee in kind or in cash charged for performing the 
GCDTP services. Producers then calculate and pay royalties based on the 
net amounts received from the midstream companies rather than the gross 
amount the midstream companies receive from the pipeline sales. By 
calculating the royalty payments on such net amounts, the royalty owners 
bear the costs of transforming the raw gas into a marketable product.”19 
With regard to the four requirements for certification of a class under 
F.R.Civ.P.23(a) (i.e. numerosity, commonality, typicality and adequacy), 
the District Court first noted that numerosity was not in dispute. As to the 
requirement of commonality, the McKnight plaintiffs had listed some 24 
questions of law or fact that were alleged to be common to the proposed 
class members. However, the Court found that many of the proposed 
common questions could not be answered for all class members in a single 
stroke, but instead required individualized inquiries by class member, by 
well and by month. Still others among the alleged common questions would 
not generate answers apt to drive resolution of the case. 
The District Court found that the Linn Defendants’ evidence showed 
that: (a) Linn uses more than 2,500 division order pay decks to dictate 
whether class members are exempt or non-exempt from deductions for the 
various gathering, compressing, dehydrating, treating and processing 
(GCDTP) services on a month-by-month basis to determine how royalty 
owners are paid; (b) Linn does not calculate and pay royalty to class 
members using a uniform methodology; and (c) whether royalty owners 
receive deductions for various GCDTP services is also impacted by how 
Linn’s revenue accounting department codes those services. The District 
Court found that those facts rendered McKnight’s proposed common 
questions to be questions that cannot be answered on a class-wide basis. 
However, it further concluded that there were at least two common 
questions of law that would generate common answers for the entire class 
and were apt to drive resolution of the litigation. 
With regard to the requirement of “typicality,” the District Court noted, 
citing one of the XTO decisions referred to above, that “[t]he Tenth Circuit 
has instructed district courts to consider whether variances in lease 
language and gas marketability have effect on typicality.” In concluding 
that the typicality requirement was not met, the Court found that “the 
differing methods of paying the royalty owners and in particular the 
                                                                                                                 
 19. 2016 WL 756541 (W.D. Okla. 2016). 
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payment methodology used on production from [the McKnights’ single 
well at issue in this case] renders the [McKnights’] claims not typical of the 
class claims. Unlike the owners of hundreds of other wells, costs associated 
with moving the [McKnight well] gas downstream from the lease were 
recorded by Linn accountants to compression and transportation cost codes 
for which the McKnights were not exempt, rather than to ‘Gath’ or 
‘Gathpa’ codes, for which the McKnights and thousands of other owners in 
hundreds of other wells were set up as ‘exempt’ from deductions.” 
In reviewing the fourth requirement under Rule 23(a) of “adequacy,” the 
District Court indicated that it had serious questions as to whether the 
McKnights, as proposed Class Representatives, could vigorously prosecute 
the proposed class action. The McKnights had testified that they had never 
seen or read their lease or check stubs and had no knowledge of the lease’s 
terms, including how it required royalties to be calculated and whether 
deductions were permitted. 
The Court found that the elements of F.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(1) could not be 
met in this case. As to F.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(3), which is the most commonly-
cited subsection of Rule 23(b) when courts have been asked to certify 
royalty owner classes, the District Court ruled that common questions of 
law and fact did not predominate in the McKnight lawsuit over questions 
affecting only individual members “because of Defendant Linn’s complex 
method of calculating and paying the individual royalties. Linn does not 
pay all royalty owners across the board in the same manner. A 
determination of how much Linn paid each royalty owner and a second 
inquiry as to how much it should have paid each owner will require owner 
by owner and month by month calculations with examination of whether 
Linn’s pay decks listed owners as exempt from some or all deductions for 
post-production services and an examination of how Linn’s revenue 
accounts ‘booked’ certain deductions.” 
Finally, after reviewing the very lengthy proposed class definition 
referenced earlier, the District Court found that class membership was not 
objectively ascertainable. Rather, the Court would be required to hold 
evidentiary hearings to determine which potential class members qualified 
for inclusion and exclusion from the class as proposed to be defined by the 
McKnight plaintiffs. 
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D. Colorado court addresses the deductibility from royalties of a 
proportionate share of certain types of costs of reaching a downstream 
market located beyond the first commercial market.  
The case of Lindauer v. Williams Production RMT Company,20 involved 
a class action royalty lawsuit, initiated in Colorado state district court in 
2006, challenging the manner in which Williams Production RMT 
Company, now known as WPX Energy Rocky Mountain, LLC (“WPX”), 
calculated and paid royalties. The parties reached a “partial” settlement in 
2008 that resolved all but two claims. Only the second unsettled claim was 
before the Court of Appeals at this time—i.e., the plaintiffs’ assertion that 
WPX improperly deducted from royalties a proportionate share of 
transportation costs incurred beyond the first commercial market during 
certain months from 2000 to July 2008. 
The key marketing and post-wellhead costs circumstances were as 
follows: WPX incurred certain compression, gathering and processing costs 
in connection with the gas. Once processed, the gas reached the tailgate of 
the gas processing plant and entered a large mainline pipeline. The costs of 
processing and moving the gas up to the point it reached the tailgate were 
not deducted in computing royalties. 
Although there was a commercial market for the gas at or near the 
tailgate of the plant, WPX sold some of the gas in downstream markets 
where higher prices were available. To be sold to those markets, the gas had 
to be transported to the point of sale. In order to secure transportation of the 
gas, WPX entered into long-term contracts with mainline pipeline 
companies in order to reserve capacity for the transportation of the gas from 
the tailgate to the downstream markets. 
The downstream transportation charges involved two components. First, 
a “demand charge” paid by WPX to reserve space in the mainline pipelines 
for the gas it delivered to the lines. The demand charge was owing and had 
to be paid without regard for whether or not WPX used the pipeline to ship 
gas. However, under WPX’s established procedures, demand charges were 
only deducted in computing royalty payments in the months when the 
particular royalty owners’ gas was shipped. The second component paid for 
the transportation services was a “commodity charge” paid by WPX per 
unit volume actually shipped on the pipeline. Those commodity charges 
were deducted from the revenues in arriving at the royalty payments to the 
plaintiffs. 
                                                                                                                 
 20. 381 P.3d 378 (Colo. App. 2016). Note: At the time this paper was written, the 
plaintiff was seeking further review before the Colorado Supreme Court. 
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It was undisputed in this case that the plaintiffs’ oil and gas leases were 
silent regarding the allocation or deduction of gas transportation costs. 
Accordingly, the parties agreed that the framework recognized in Garman 
v. Conoco, Inc.21 and Rogers v. Westerman Farm Co.22 governed the issue. 
The parties also agreed that the tailgate of the processing plant was, under 
the facts of this case, the first commercial market for the gas and that the 
transportation costs incurred prior to that point were not deductible from 
royalties. At issue here was whether the costs incurred to transport the gas 
to downstream markets beyond the first commercial market were 
deductible. 
The plaintiffs argued, based upon the holdings in Garman and Rogers, 
that the costs WPX incurred to transport gas downstream were deductible 
only if WPX could show that (1) the costs were reasonable (the 
“reasonableness test”), and (2) the actual royalty revenues were increased in 
proportion with the costs assessed against the royalties (the “enhancement 
test”). The plaintiffs did not contest the reasonableness of the transportation 
costs, but they disputed whether actual royalty revenues increased in 
proportion to those costs. Specifically, the plaintiffs asserted that WPX 
must show that the royalty revenues increased on a “month-by-month” 
basis by comparing the downstream prices at the point of sale to the price of 
gas at the first commercial market. 
In response, WPX first argued that the enhancement test does not apply 
to costs incurred to transport the gas to downstream markets. Alternatively, 
WPX argued that, even if the enhancement test applied, it must be 
determined based on the “prudent operator rule” rather than a month-by-
month price comparison. Under that approach, the court would consider the 
overall reasonableness of WPX’s decisions to enter into long-term 
transportation contracts, as well as the long-term benefits to royalty owners 
as a result of WPX’s downstream marketing strategy.  
Prior to trial, the district court entered two orders resolving WPX’s 
arguments in favor of the plaintiffs. First, it found that the enhancement test 
applies to all costs incurred after the gas becomes marketable in order to be 
deductible from royalty payments, and that WPX bore the burden of proof 
in showing an actual increase in royalty revenues. Second, the district court 
required that WPX apply the enhancement test on a month-by-month basis, 
and it rejected WPX’s contention that the enhancement test should be 
evaluated based on the prudent operator rule.  
                                                                                                                 
 21. 886 P.2d 652, 661 (Colo. 1994). 
 22. 29 P.3d 887, 903 (Colo. 2001). 
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The court then held a bench trial to measure the price of gas at the first 
commercial market against the downstream price. At that trial, WPX 
showed that its downstream marketing strategy allowed it to substantially 
increase the volume of production from the plaintiffs’ wells during the 8 
year period at issue. Combined with the price increase that was also 
received downstream as to many months, WPX maintained that overall 
revenues for the 8 year period as a whole were approximately $6 million 
higher that if the gas had been sold at the first commercial market (i.e., at 
the tailgate of the plant). However, the district court found that WPX did 
not prove enhancement of the price as to 35 months of the 8-year period, 
and it ordered an accounting. Based on that accounting, the district court 
entered judgment against WPX for $5,136,296.95. WPX appealed. 
The Colorado Court of Appeals agreed with WPX and held that the rules 
of law pronounced in Garman and Rogers do not require post-marketability 
transportation costs to meet the enhancement test in order to be deducted 
from royalty payments. The court further held that other considerations 
militated against imposing an enhancement test on transportation costs. The 
court concluded that “post-marketability transportation costs are deductible 
if they are reasonable, and that lessees are not required to establish that such 
costs enhance the value of the gas or increase royalty revenues.”23 The 
court further found that the statute on which the district court relied had no 
bearing on whether the enhancement test applied to the deductibility of 
post-marketability transportation costs. Because of those holdings, the court 
did not need to address whether the enhancement test must be applied on a 
moth-by-month basis. 
In reaching the above conclusions, some of the more notable findings of 
the Colorado Court of Appeals were as follows: 
The Lindauer court noted that the royalty owners in Garman conceded 
that (1) the transportation costs associated with moving marketable gas 
from the tailgate of the processing plant (where the gas entered the 
interstate pipeline) to the point of sale were properly deductible, and (2) the 
costs incurred to process raw gas into its component parts after a 
marketable product had been obtained were generally deductible to the 
extent they were reasonable, provided such operations actually enhanced 
the value of the product.24 Referencing those concessions, the court in 
Garman then stated the rule that is referred to as the enhancement test.25 
                                                                                                                 
 23. Lindauer, 381 P.3d at 381. 
 24. Garman, 886 P.2d at 655, n. 8.  
 25. Lindauer, 381 P.3d at 382. 
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Contrary to the Lindauer plaintiffs’ contention, the Garman decision did 
not address whether post-marketability transportation costs are subject to 
the enhancement test. Indeed, Garman quoted language from a treatise 
stating that “[a]fter a marketable product has been obtained, then further 
costs in improving or transporting such product should be shared by the 
lessor and lessee. . .”26 
In order to deduct certain post-marketability processing costs that 
enhance the value of an already marketable product, the court in Garman 
held that the lessee must show that (1) the costs are reasonable and (2) 
actual royalty revenues increased in proportion with the deducted costs.27 
The Colorado Supreme Court in Garman treated processing costs and 
transportation costs as separate categories, and only the reasonableness 
requirement was mentioned with respect to transportation costs.28 
Accordingly, the Garman decision did not expressly require post-
marketability transportation costs to meet the enhancement test in order to 
be deductible. 
In the Rogers case, the Colorado Supreme Court “reaffirmed its holding 
in Garman and concluded that where a lease is silent on the issue, the 
implied covenant to market requires the lessee to bear all costs of obtaining 
a marketable product.”29 However, contrary to the plaintiffs’ contention and 
the district court’s interpretation, Rogers did not expressly state that the 
enhancement test applies to all post-marketability costs.30 
The court noted the statements in Rogers that “[o]nce a product is 
marketable, however, additional costs incurred to either improve the 
product, or transport the product, are to be shared proportionately by the 
lessor and lessee. All costs must be reasonable.”31 “Thus, when referring to 
the deduction of post-marketability transportation costs, the court in Rogers 
required only that such costs be ‘reasonable’.”32 
In sum, the Court of Appeals concluded that neither Garman nor Rogers 
require that transportation costs, incurred after the first commercial market, 
                                                                                                                 
 26. Garman, 886 P.2d at 661, n.27 (quoting 3 Eugene Kuntz, A Treatise on the Law of 
Oil and Gas § 40.5 (1979 & 1994 Supp.)) 
 27. Id. at 382-83. 
 28. Id. at 383. 
 29. Id.  
 30. Id.  
 31. Id.  
 32. Id. 
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enhance the value of the gas or increase royalty revenues in order to be 
deducted from royalty payments.33 
Additionally, the Colorado Court of Appeals found that other 
considerations militate against requiring transportation costs to meet the 
enhancement test. Imposing an enhancement requirement on transportation 
costs, particularly on a month-by-month basis, ignores the commercial 
realities of the marketplace.34 The court found that an enhancement test 
which compares gas prices in downstream markets to those in markets 
closer to the wells and field, 
does not account for the significant increase in the volume of gas 
produced from plaintiffs’ wells as a result of downstream 
marketing. There was evidence presented at trial that plaintiffs 
realized a tenfold increase in the volume of gas produced during 
the eight-year period at issue, and a mere price comparison does 
not indicate whether the same volume of gas could have been 
sold in the local market. Moreover, WPX maintains that its 
decision to transport gas out of the Piceance Basin altered local 
prices, and it is unlikely that those same prices would be 
available had the gas only been sold locally.35 
The court further found that the enhancement test urged by the Lindauer 
plaintiffs and imposed by the district court failed to take into account the 
long-term nature of decisions to market gas downstream. WPX presented 
evidence at trial that it had to invest in long-term transportation contracts to 
guarantee access to downstream markets and to obtain higher downstream 
prices, and that those decisions could not be made or changed on a monthly 
basis. “Thus, a month by month enhancement requirement is inconsistent 
with the long-term nature of the downstream marketing strategy and its 
long-term benefits.”36 
The court noted that the rule proposed by the district court and the 
plaintiffs “would give plaintiffs a ‘free ride’ by allowing them to enjoy the 
                                                                                                                 
 33. Id. at 385. The court noted that the Lindauer plaintiffs had additionally cited the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court’s decision in Mittelstaedt v. Santa Fe Minerals, Inc., 954 P.2d 
1203 (Okla. 1998). The court noted that Mittelstaedt “cited Garman in applying the 
enhancement test to transportation costs incurred after the gas was marketable. 954 P.2d 
1203, 1208 (Okla.1998). However, Mittelstaedt was decided before our supreme court 
announced Rogers, and, in any event, the Oklahoma court’s application of Garman is not 
controlling in Colorado.” Lindauer 381 P.3d at 385. 
 34. Lindauer 381 P.3d at 385. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
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long-term benefits of WPX’s downstream marketing strategy in certain 
months, while avoiding paying their proportionate share of the costs in 
other months.”37 
Finally, the court rejected the contention that certain Colorado Statutes38 
which required lessees to pay royalties and report deductions on a monthly 
basis and provide a written explanation of those deductions upon request 
(i.e., check stub statutes) provided any support for the application of an 
enhancement test to post-marketability transportation costs. 
Since the plaintiffs did not challenge the reasonableness of the 
transportation costs incurred to reach the downstream markets, the Court of 
Appeals concluded that those costs were deductible from royalty payments 
and reversed the judgment of the district court. 
E. Kansas Federal District Court Provides Preliminary Comments 
Regarding the 2015 Fawcett Decision of the Kansas Supreme Court 
Addressing Deductions From Royalty Payments. 
The court in Roderick Revocable Living Trust v. XTO Energy, Inc.,39 
considered the plaintiff’s motion to amend its complaint in light of the 
pronouncements of Kansas royalty law that were part of the 2015 decision 
in Fawcett v. Oil Producers, Inc. of Kansas.40 The court consolidated its 
consideration of the plaintiff’s motion to amend with a like motion pending 
before him by the plaintiff in Roderick Revocable Living Turst v. OXY USA, 
Inc.41 In both cases, the plaintiff royalty owners “claim that the Defendants 
underpaid them for gas produced from Kansas wells, in part by deducting 
from their payments the costs of rendering the gas marketable. The parties 
agree upon the applicability of the “Marketable Condition Rule” (“MCR”), 
an outgrowth of the implied duty to market, which broadly provides that the 
cost of making gas marketable falls solely on the operator-lessee, and not 
on the royalty owner-lessor.”42 
The U.S. District Court noted that the royalty owners in Fawcett “argued 
the raw gas was not marketable, for purposes of the MCR, until it enters an 
interstate pipeline, but the court disagreed. Although it noted ‘what it means 
to be “marketable” remains an open question [in Kansas].’ ”43 The district 
                                                                                                                 
 37. Id. at 385-86. 
 38. Section 34-60-118.5(2), (2.3) and (2.5). 
 39. No. 08-1330-EFM-GEB, 2016 WL 742879 (D. Kan. Feb. 24, 2016). 
 40. 352 P.3d 1032 (Kan. 2015). 
 41. U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas, Case No. 12-1215-EFM-GEB. 
 42. 2016 WL 742879 at *1. 
 43. Id. at *3 (citing Fawcett, 352 P.3d at 1042). 
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court further observed that the Kansas Supreme Court in Fawcett “injected 
into its analysis the concept of good faith and fair dealing.”44 
The parties in the present Roderick cases sought to amend their 
complaints “to clarify [their] claims in light of the Fawcett ruling, and 
specifically to include allegations which reflect the duty of good faith 
articulated in Fawcett. However, both defendants oppose amendment or 
supplementation of the pleadings, arguing that amendments are untimely 
and futile in light of the Fawcett ruling.”45 More specifically, the 
defendants asserted that “Fawcett did not actually introduce the concept of 
a good faith sale into the marketability determination, because the duty of 
good faith and fair dealing is implied in every contract and the implied duty 
to market has long incorporated its own good faith element.”46 The 
defendants argued that, as a consequence, it was misleading for Roderick to 
suggest that this was a “new” claim, and Roderick should have included 
allegations regarding good faith from the inception of each case, such that 
the current motions were untimely. 
The district court rejected the foregoing argument, finding: “While the 
concept of good faith is clearly not new, the Kansas Supreme Court’s focus 
on the concept, and suggested analysis of those factors which could 
demonstrate good faith, does appear novel. Therefore, the Court does not 
find Plaintiff’s delay to be undue or unexplained.”47  
Additionally, the defendants argued that “the Fawcett ruling clearly 
rejected Plaintiff’s entire theory of recovery under the MCR, because 
Plaintiff’s claim thus far has been that the gas we not marketable (and 
Defendants bore full responsibility for making it so) until it reached 
interstate pipeline quality—very similar to the Fawcett plaintiffs’ claims. 
Therefore, Defendants argue Plaintiff’s proposed amendment is futile and 
should be denied.”48 However, the district court found that the defendants’ 
contention was “an oversimplification of the Fawcett ruling, which found 
the definition of marketability, while not necessarily defined by the 
interstate pipeline quality, could not be decided as a matter of law.”49 The 
court concluded that it could not find the proposed amendments to the 
complaints, based largely on the Fawcett ruling, to be futile. 
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 45. Id. at *4. 
 46. Id. at *5. 
 47. Id. (Emphasis added by the court). 
 48. Id. at *6. 
 49. Id. 
http://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol2/iss5/3
2017]        Energy Litigation Update 2016 443 
 
 
The district court granted the plaintiff’s motions to amend its complaint 
to add allegations taking into account the Fawcett decision. 
F. Federal District Court in Kansas Grants Motion to Decertify Class 
Based Upon the Fawcett, Roderick and Wal-Mart Decisions That Were 
Issued After the Certification of the Class in 2011. 
In Wallace B. Roderick Revocable Living Trust v. OXY USA, Inc.,50 
OXY moved the court to decertify a plaintiff royalty owner class certified 
in 2011 by the state District Court of Kearny County, Kansas before the 
case was removed to federal court. The court described the pertinent 
principles of Kansas royalty law as follows: 
Corollary to this implied duty to market [the minerals produced] is the 
marketable condition rule, which “requires operators to make gas 
marketable at their own expense.” These duties can be contractually 
disclaimed. If the duties were not disclaimed in this case, OXY would have 
been required to make the raw gas marketable and to bear the 
accompanying costs. Steps taken to make raw gas marketable often include 
gathering, compression, dehydration, treatment, and processing (“GCDTP”) 
services. But in other circumstances, gas may be marketable at the well.51 
The plaintiffs (Roderick) sued OXY in March 2008 alleging that OXY 
improperly deducted from royalty payment certain costs associated with 
rendering gas into marketable condition. Roderick sought to certify a class 
of all royalty owners in Kansas wells operated by OXY. The proposed class 
comprised approximately 1,900 wells and 2,300 oil and gas leases. Those 
wells connected to 8 different gas gathering systems, and gas was delivered 
to 5 different plants for processing. OXY sold some of the raw gas at the 
wellhead pursuant to 17 different gas purchase agreements. The rest of the 
gas was produced and marketed as follows: Most of the gas production was 
subject to 6 separate processing agreements with third-party plants. There 
were also 6 gathering agreements, 3 transportation agreements and 2 
separate helium purchase agreements.  
Royalty payments were based on these multiple contracts, and so the 
royalty payments varied accordingly. Roderick contends that all of the 
above transactions on which royalties were based took place “before any 
                                                                                                                 
 50. No. 12-1215-EFM-GEB, 2016 WL 3423133 (D. Kan. June 22, 2016). 
 51. Id. at *1 (citing Fawcett, 352 P.3d at 1034; Sternberger v. Marathon Oil Co., 894 
P.2d 788, 800 (Kan. 1995)). 
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GCDTP services had been performed on the gas”52 and that royalties were 
based on prices for gas that was not in marketable condition. 
After the class was certified, the case was removed to federal court. 
“Since then, the United States Supreme Court, the Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals, and the Kansas Supreme Court have each issued decisions that 
directly impact class certification analysis and Kansas oil and gas law. 
Relying on these recent developments, OXY now moves to decertify the 
class.”53 
The court concluded that Roderick’s plausible road to recovery is 
different now than it was when the class was certified in 2011, and that 
Roderick’s new road involves different issues which are not common to the 
class as currently certified. In reaching that conclusion, some of the primary 
findings of the court were as follows: 
The court rejected Roderick’s argument that the issue of when the gas 
from the class wells reached “marketable condition” was a common issue 
because the plaintiff contends that “none of the gas in question was 
marketable until it had been processed, reached commercial grade, and was 
sold to a third party.”54 The court found that the 2015 decision of the 
Kansas Supreme Court in Fawcett 
rejected the proposition that marketability can be determined as a 
matter of law, and went on to hold that an operator’s duty to 
make gas marketable is satisfied “when the operator delivers the 
gas to the purchaser in a condition acceptable to the purchaser in 
a good faith transaction.” This “good faith” qualification impacts 
the Court’s commonality determination. Fawcett made clear that 
the question of marketability is a factual one. There is no 
“precise quality or condition at which gas becomes marketable.” 
Rather, the marketability of gas is “an open question” that 
depends on the parties’ willingness to buy and sell it. The gas in 
this case reached marketable condition when OXY delivered it in 
a condition acceptable to the purchaser. Tying the marketability 
of gas to a precise quality or condition is no longer a viable 
theory of recovery.55  
                                                                                                                 
 52. Id. at *2. 
 53. Id. (citing Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S.Ct. 2541 (2011); Wallace B. 
Roderick Revocable Living Trust v. XTO Energy, Inc., 725 F.3d 1213 (10th Cir. 2013); 
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The court further observed that, in order to prevail under a theory of 
“breach of the marketable condition rule,” Roderick would need to illustrate 
that the gas was not in a marketable condition at the wellhead, and thus 
OXY’s deductions were improper. To contest marketability, Roderick 
would need to challenge OXY’s contention that in “its various wellhead 
agreements,” OXY was delivering gas in a condition acceptable to the 
purchaser in a good faith transaction. The court found that, given this 
framework, the class certified in 2011 did not satisfy Rule 23(a)(2). The 
question of when the gas at issue in this case reached marketable condition 
is not “of such a nature that it is capable of classwide resolution.” Instead, 
that determination would require individual inquiries into each marketing 
contract to assess whether, under Fawcett, the gas was in marketable 
condition.56  
The court found that, if Roderick challenged the good faith of the 
transaction, the agreements would have to be so uniform in substance and 
formation that their good faith could be determined in a single stroke. 
Otherwise, a class action challenging the good faith of a transaction would 
be limited to wells subject to a single agreement.57 
The court concluded that if Roderick can illustrate that the question of 
marketability, as defined by Fawcett, is common to a given class of royalty 
owners, then a class action may be proper. However, “those allegations 
were not made when this class was initially certified, and are not made 
here. The class as presently constituted is improper. OXY’s motion to 
decertify is granted.”58 
G. Court addresses inter alia claims for royalty on fuel used in operations 
and on drip condensate, whether royalty was owed based on the gross 
volume of gas produced at the wellhead, and whether the lessee has a duty 
to “trace the gas molecules” from the lessors’ well to the exact downstream 
market to which those molecules were delivered and sold. 
The case of Anderson Living Trust v. Energen Resources Corp.59 
presented, in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Mexico, a 
series of royalty issues including whether fuel used in operations and drip 
condensate were royalty bearing under the facts presented and whether the 
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lessee has a duty to, as some have termed it, “trace the molecules of gas” 
from a given producing well to a specific downstream gas buyer.  
The plaintiffs owned royalty and overriding royalty interests in oil and 
gas leases of Energen, and in wells, located in two states; however, this 
decision addressed only the plaintiffs’ claims under New Mexico law.60 The 
plaintiffs sued Energen alleging claims that the court found could all be 
fairly described as allegations of royalty underpayment, even though the 
manner of the alleged underpayments may differ. The court noted that the 
plaintiffs did, however, dismiss their claim for underpricing.61 
Energen incurred costs for post-production services performed by third 
parties in order to gather, compress and process the gas produced from the 
subject New Mexico wells. Energen deducted the third-party expenses it 
incurred for those purposes. The plaintiffs did not challenge the 
reasonableness of these monetary deductions, nor did they contend that the 
costs were excessive or were not actually incurred by Energen. Rather, they 
only objected to the fact that those costs were deducted from their royalty 
payments.  
The New Mexico plaintiffs had “royalty agreements (or overriding 
royalty agreements)” that addressed the calculation of royalties. The 
Anderson-Pritchett lease provided for royalties on the “market value [of the 
gas] at the well. The comparable provision in the Neely-Robertson lease 
provided for payment on the “prevailing field market price.” “As Defendant 
observes, there are no functional differences between the two leases for 
purposes of calculating royalties because both provisions are based on the 
market value or price of the gas at the well. This lease language means that 
before royalties are paid, the market value for gas at the well must be 
determined.”62 
The plaintiffs asserted that they should be paid royalties based on the 
volume of the gas produced at the wellhead, “arguing that gas volume is 
greatly reduced after processing and after reductions that occur from use of 
plant fuel. In other words, Plaintiffs want to be paid based on the particular 
number of molecules of gas coming out of the wellhead.”63 However, the 
court found that “there is no way to pay Plaintiffs an actual ‘price’ for gas 
from an individual well because the tracing of individual molecules of gas 
‘is physically impossible from the moment the gas enters’ the gathering 
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system.”64 The court found that the plaintiffs offered no argument for why 
they were entitled to royalty payments based strictly upon the share of gas 
produced from their wells, nor would any such argument be supported by 
the royalty provisions contained in their leases. Rather, the court concluded 
that the language in the two oil and gas leases (which referred to “market 
value” and “prevailing field market price”) clearly intended for royalty 
payments to be based on the downstream value of the gas at its market 
value.65 
In concluding that Energen was entitled to summary judgment on all 
claims asserted by the plaintiffs under New Mexico law, the court reached 
many additional noteworthy findings, conclusions and rulings, with some of 
the key ones being as follows: 
The plaintiffs’ argument against the deduction of post-production costs 
“ignores the operable language calling for payments to be based on ‘market 
value.’ “ The court cited Abraham v. BP America Production Co.66 in 
which the 10th Circuit held that a market-value royalty owner is entitled to 
be paid based on the market value of unprocessed gas at the well, or an 
acceptable estimation of that value through a netback calculation. Under the 
netback or work-back method for calculating the market value of gas at the 
lease, “costs of transportation, processing, or manufacturing are deducted 
from the proceeds received for the gas. The value of gas using the ‘netback’ 
or ‘workback’ methodology is determined by taking the downstream sales 
price and deducting from it the costs incurred by the working interest owner 
to move the gas from the point of valuation to the actual point of sale.”67 
The court concluded that, “in accordance with New Mexico law, Energen is 
entitled to deduct post-production costs for its services in getting the gas 
into a marketable condition.” 
As part of the compensation to the third-party processor under their 
agreement, Energen reimbursed the processor for all taxes, including the 
New Mexico natural gas processors tax. Energen treated the reimbursed 
taxes like any other post-production cost and deducted it in computing 
royalty payments. The royalty owners argued that they should not have to 
pay the tax because the underlying statute made the gas processor liable for 
the tax instead of the interest owners. The court found that there is no 
                                                                                                                 
 64. Id. In connection with that finding, the court cited In re Assessment Against Mo. 
Gas Energy, 234 P.3d 938, 944 (Okla. 2009), and W. W. McDonald Land Co. v. EQT 
Production Co., 983 F.Supp.2d 790, 803 (S.D. W. Va. 2013). 
 65. Energen, 161 F. Supp. 3d at 1060. 
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language in the applicable New Mexico statute68 which suggests that the 
privilege tax cannot be shared with the royalty owner in the form of a 
royalty deduction in order to cover reimbursement to the processor who by 
statute was designated to be the party to remit the tax. Moreover, the court 
found that the deductibility of the tax as a post-production cost called for a 
return to the oil and gas lease language which the court had already 
determined allowed for the deduction of post-production costs under New 
Mexico law, which does not recognize a duty to market on the part of the 
producer.69 
Energen allowed the third-party processors to keep the fuel used in 
downstream processing as an in-kind cost or compensation in the form of 
free field and plant fuel. The third-party processors use field fuel to run 
compressors in the field to compress the gas in order to move it 
downstream, or plant fuel, which is fuel that is used in the processing plant 
and is consumed by the plant in order to process the gas and extract liquids 
or to otherwise improve the gas. The royalty owners asserted that they 
should be paid royalties on the gas used by the processors in-kind for its 
production services. The court noted that it was uncontested that Energen 
did not sell that gas, that it did not market that gas, and that it received no 
proceeds for that gas. Under the leases, the royalty owner plaintiffs were 
entitled only to royalties on the market value or market price of the gas. 
“Because the field and plant gas used in the processing was not sold and 
Energen received no proceeds from that gas, it cannot be considered gas 
that was marketed and so no royalties are owed.”70 
In its order granting the operator’s motion for summary judgment, the 
court then engaged in a lengthy analysis of the impact of the varying 
wording in the “free use” provisions in the underlying oil and gas leases on 
the royalty underpayment claims. 
The royalty owners finally claimed that Energen failed to pay royalties 
on “drip condensate,” asserting that Energen was not entitled to free use of 
the drip condensate. Energen responded that the drip condensate was not 
used by the processors. Rather, the gatherers were entitled to retain the drip 
condensate as part of their compensation for their gathering and processing 
services pursuant to a contract between Energen and those third parties. The 
royalty owners countered that “plaintiffs never agreed to allowing Energy 
to give away drip condensate to these third parties.”71 However, the court 
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found that the plaintiff royalty owners “cannot have it both ways.” The 
royalty owners cannot demand to be paid based on the volume produced at 
the wellhead (where values for gas are lower), while also insisting that the 
royalties on those wellhead volumes be valued based on the enhanced value 
of the gas downstream, without sharing in any of the costs involved to 
increase its value for market.  
The court concluded that “Energen is entitled to summary judgment on 
all claims asserted by Plaintiffs under New Mexico law.”72 
H. Court addresses issue of whether the producer was allowed to deduct in 
computing royalties a “pro rata allocation” (as opposed to the actual 
volumes for each well) of the lost and used gas, when the applicable oil and 
gas lease did not contain express wording addressing the issue. Court also 
addresses whether there is a duty on the part of producers to “trace the 
molecules of gas.” 
The royalty owner appellants in Hall v. CNX Gas Company, LLC73 
presented on appeal a single issue that the court described as a being one of 
first impression:74 “Whether a natural gas producer may allocate [to the 
royalty owners a 1/8th share of75] lost and used gas even without a 
provision in the lease authorizing it to do so when, under established 
Pennsylvania law, oil and gas leases are to be narrowly construed and the 
rights not directly conferred by the lease language are to be considered 
withheld by the lessor?”76 The applicable royalty provision quoted by the 
court provided as follows: 
Royalties. The royalties to be paid by the Lessee are: 
. . . .  
(b) on gas, including casinghead gas or other gaseous 
substances, produced from said land and sold or used beyond the 
                                                                                                                 
 72. Id. at 1069. 
 73. 137 A.3d 597 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2016). 
 74. Id. at 601. 
 75. Id. at fn. 9. 
 76. Id. at 600-01. In Footnote 4 of the decision, the court noted that the Halls had also 
alleged at the inception of the dispute that the allocation of post-production costs was not 
permitted by the lease. However, they subsequently withdrew that claim in light of the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in Kilmer v. Elexco Land Servs., Inc., 605 Pa. 413, 
990 A.2d 1147 (2010), which the court in Hall described as holding that a lease that utilized 
the net-back method to allocate post-production costs for purposes of calculating royalties 
did not violate the GMRA (i.e., the Guaranteed Minimum Royalty Act, 58 P.S. § 33). 
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well or for the extraction of gasoline or other product, an amount 
equal to one-eighth of the net amount realized by Lessee 
computed at the wellhead from the sale of such substances. On 
gas sold at the well, the royalty shall be one-eighth of the amount 
realized by Lessee from such sale.77 
The court found that “the bulk of the gas is not sold at the wellhead but is 
transported via pipeline downstream to the point of sale. The Hall lease 
provides that, for gas sold or used beyond the well, Lessor is entitled to a 
royalty of one-eighth of the net amount realized from the sale. This is 
generally referred to as a proceeds lease, and the parties agree that royalties 
are payable only on the gas sold.”78 The Hall lease gave the lessee the right 
to drill and operate the Halls’ wells in conjunction with the wells on 
neighboring properties, and further gave the lessee the right to use, free of 
cost, “oil, gas and water produced on said land for its operations.”79 
The gas produced from the Hall properties feeds into a gas gathering 
system. At various points along that pipeline, gas produced from other 
wells is commingled with that of the Halls and is transported to the point of 
sale. The lessee, CNX, described its method for computing royalties as 
follows: 
The royalty payment to each [lessor] is computed by dividing the 
volume of gas as measured at each well head by the total volume 
of gas measured at all of the wellheads that feed into the sales 
point. This value is multiplied by the amount realized on the sale 
by CNX to compute each well’s proportionate share of the 
amount realized from the sale.80 
The Halls contended that since the lease did not authorize the “pro rata 
allocation” of lost and used gas among the lessors, CNX was limited to 
deducting only “actual volumes” of lost and used gas from each lessor’s 
share of the royalty. As CNX did not measure the volume of gas from each 
well just prior to the point of commingling, and therefore could not attribute 
to an individual well the precise amount of gas lost or used from that well, 
the Halls contended that CNX was obligated to pay royalties based on the 
volume of gas measured at each wellhead with no reduction. 
                                                                                                                 
 77. Id. at 598-99. 
 78. Id. at 599. 
 79. Id.  
 80. Id.  
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CNX moved for summary judgment on the basis that, due to the fungible 
nature of the compound and the physical impossibility of independently 
tracking each molecule from its source, it was impossible to attribute any 
specific amount of gas lost or used to any one of the individual wells along 
the pipeline.81 CNX asserted that no royalty was due on gas that was lost or 
used prior to the point of sale, and it maintained that it did not deduct an 
allocated amount of lost and used gas from the royalty payable on each 
well.82 The Halls argued that, without language in the oil and gas lease 
permitting a proportionate allocation of lost and used gas, CNX could 
deduct from their royalties only the amount of gas actually lost and/or used 
as measured from each well.83 The Halls essentially argued that they were 
entitled to royalties based on the volume of gas produced as measured at 
each wellhead, despite the lease provision calculating the royalty on the 
volumes of gas sold.84 
The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of CNX. The royalty 
owners appealed. In affirming the lower court’s ruling in favor of CNX, the 
court noted that the lease provides that royalties are to be based on the net 
amount realized at the point of sale, and that the volume of gas that was lost 
and used is not part of the royalty calculation in the present case. “Gas lost 
or used on the way to the point of sale is simply not part of the royalty 
computation. It necessarily follows that lost and used gas is not allocated 
when the royalty is allocated among the various lessors.”85 
Regarding the issue of whether the lessee has a duty under the lease to be 
able to trace the actual production from each wellhead to the place of sale 
so that it knows the specific market at which those particular volumes were 
sold, the court cited the earlier case of Pollock v. Energy Corp. of Am.,86 in 
which the court looked to expert testimony regarding industry custom and 
practice to the effect that “it has long been the custom in the industry to 
combine gas production from several wells and the use a reasonably 
method of allocation to calculate the royalties for the individual wells.87 
However, the court found in its concluding ruling that, since the language 
                                                                                                                 
 81. Id. at 600-01. 
 82. More specifically, CNX asserted that royalties were “calculated when the gas was 
sold, and at that point, the lost and used gas was not in existence. In short, royalties were not 
due on lost and used gas as it did not reach the point of sale.” Id. at 603.  
 83. Id. at 602. 
 84. Id.  
 85. Id. at 604. 
 86. No. 10-1553, 2013 WL 275327 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 24, 2013). 
 87. Hall, 137 A.3d at 604-05. 
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of the oil and gas lease provided the basis of its ruling, there was no need 
for the court to “consider the wisdom of importing industry custom and 
practice to supply missing contract terms.”88 
I. Texas Supreme Court denies motion for rehearing with respect to its 
2015 decision in the Hyder case and issues substituted opinion in 2016. 
In Chesapeake Exploration, L.L.C. v. Hyder,89 a 5-4 majority of the 
Texas Supreme Court denied Chesapeake’s motion for rehearing that had 
been filed with respect to its June 12, 2015, decision in the case. The 
majority issued a substituted opinion making few changes to their original 
opinion.  
The court in Hyder was presented with a suit for the alleged 
underpayment of the sums due under the “overriding royalty” provisions of 
an oil and gas lease that provided for both royalty and overriding royalty 
payments. The Hyders alleged that their overriding royalty payments were 
free of postproduction costs and that Chesapeake had improperly deducted 
postproduction expenses in computing the Hyders’ payments. After a bench 
trial, the court ruled in favor of the Hyders and awarded them $575,359.90 
as a result of the cost deductions. The Texas Court of Appeals affirmed. 
The Texas Supreme Court granted discretionary review. 
The Texas Supreme Court began its decision with the following 
statement: 
Generally speaking, an overriding royalty on oil and gas 
production is free of production costs but must bear its share of 
postproduction costs unless the parties agree otherwise. The only 
question in this case is whether the parties’ lease expresses a 
different agreement. We conclude it does and therefore affirm 
the court of appeals’ judgment.90 
The oil and gas lease at issue in this case contained three royalty 
provisions—an oil royalty clause, a gas royalty clause91 and a clause 
                                                                                                                 
 88. Id. at 605. 
 89. 483 S.W.3d 870 (Tex. 2016). 
 90. Id. at 871. 
 91. The lease contains three royalty provisions. One is for 25% of “the market value at 
the well of all oil and other liquid hydrocarbons.” No oil is produced from the lease. Another 
royalty is for 25% “of the price actually received by Lessee” for all gas produced from the 
leased premises and sold or used. The lease adds that the royalty is expressly “free and clear 
of all production and post-production costs and expenses,” and lists examples of various 
expenses. The third provision, the one here in dispute, calls for “a perpetual, cost-free 
(except only its portion of production taxes) overriding royalty of five percent (5.0%) of 
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providing for “a perpetual cost-free (except only its portion of production 
taxes) overriding royalty of five percent (5.0%) of gross production 
obtained”92 from directional wells drilled on the lease but bottomed on 
nearby land. 
The lease additionally included a provision to the effect that “Lessors 
and Lessee agree that the holding in the case of Heritage Resources, Inc. v. 
NationsBank, 939 S.W.2d 118 (Tex. 1996) shall have no application to the 
terms and provisions of this Lease.” The lease also gave each lessor the 
option to take their royalty share in kind.93 However, no lessor had ever 
exercised that option. 
The Hyders and Chesapeake agreed that the overriding royalty was free 
of production costs; however, they dispute whether it is also free of 
postproduction costs. The gas from the subject wells was sold by 
Chesapeake to an affiliate, Chesapeake Energy Marketing, Inc. (CEMI). 
CEMI then gathered and transported the gas through both affiliated and 
interstate pipelines for sale to unaffiliated third party purchasers in distant 
markets. The gas price paid by CEMI to Chesapeake was determined based 
on the weighted average of the third party sales prices, less postproduction 
costs. The Hyders contend that their overriding royalty should be based on 
the gas sales price paid by the third party buyers without any deduction of 
postproduction costs. 
After a bench trial, the trial court rendered judgment for the Hyders and 
awarded them $575,359.90 in postproduction costs that the court found 
were wrongfully deducted by Chesapeake in computing their overriding 
royalty payments. The Texas Court of Appeals affirmed.  
The Texas Supreme Court granted Chesapeake’s Petition for Review. In 
affirming the decisions below, the Texas Supreme Court held in part as 
follows: 
The court stated that “we long ago defined an overriding royalty as ‘a 
given percentage of the gross production carved from the working interest 
but, by agreement, not chargeable with any of the expenses of operation.’ 
That agreement is now understood to be part of an overriding royalty, and 
an overriding royalty is like a landowner’s royalty in that it usually bears 
postproduction costs but not production costs, though the parties may agree 
to a different arrangement.”94 
                                                                                                                 
gross production obtained” from directional wells drilled on the lease but bottomed on 
nearby land. Id. at 871-72. 
 92. Id. at 872. 
 93. Id.  
 94. Id. at 872-73. 
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The Hyders argued that the language of the lease made the overriding 
royalty free of postproduction costs. Specifically, they asserted that the 
wording in the lease providing “that the overriding royalty be ‘cost-free’ 
can only refer to postproduction costs, since the royalty is by nature already 
free of production costs without saying so.”95 However, the court noted 
that, as with the gas royalty, “cost-free” may simply emphasize that the 
overriding royalty is free of production costs. So the court disagreed with 
the Hyders that “cost-free” in the overriding royalty provision could not 
refer to production costs. “As noted above, drafters frequently specify that 
an overriding royalty does not bear production costs even though an 
overriding royalty is already free of production costs simply because it is a 
royalty interest. But Chesapeake must show that while the general term 
‘cost-free’ does not distinguish between production and postproduction 
costs and thus literally refers to all costs, it nevertheless cannot refer to 
postproduction costs here.”96 
“Chesapeake argues that the gas royalty provision shows that when the 
parties wanted a postproduction-cost-free royalty, they were much more 
specific. But as we have already said, the additional detail in the gas royalty 
provision serves only, if anything, to emphasize its cost-free nature. The 
simple ‘cost-free’ requirement of the overriding royalty achieves the same 
end.”97 
The court rejected the Hyders’ contention that their override was free 
from postproduction costs because of the above-referenced provision in the 
lease that specifically disclaimed any application of the holding in the prior 
Heritage Resources case: “Heritage Resources does not suggest, much less 
hold, that a royalty cannot be made free of postproduction costs. Heritage 
Resources holds only that the effect of a lease is governed by a fair reading 
of its text. A disclaimer of that holding, like the one in this case, cannot free 
a royalty of postproduction costs when the text of the lease itself does not 
do so. Here, the lease text clearly frees the gas royalty of postproduction 
costs, and reasonably interpreted, we conclude, does the same for the 
overriding royalty. The disclaimer of Heritage Resources’ holding does not 
influence our conclusion.”98 
The court acknowledged that “[w]ere the Hyders to take their overriding 
royalty in kind, as they are entitled to do, they might use the gas on the 
property, transport it themselves to a buyer, or pay a third party to transport 
                                                                                                                 
 95. Id. at 873. 
 96. Id. at 874. 
 97. Id. at 875. 
 98. Id. at 876. 
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the gas to market as they might negotiate. In any event, the Hyders might or 
might not incur postproduction costs equal to those charged by Marketing. 
The lease gives them that choice. . . The fact that the Hyders might or might 
not be subject to postproduction costs by taking the gas in kind does not 
suggest that they must be subject to those costs when the royalty is paid in 
cash. The choice of how to take their royalty, and the consequences, are left 
to the Hyders. Accordingly, we conclude that ‘cost-free’ in the overriding 
royalty provision includes postproduction costs.”99 
Four of the nine justices of the Texas Supreme Court joined in a 
dissenting opinion. 
J. Court rejects effort by new plaintiff to seek class certification as to a 
similar royalty owner class as another court refused to certify in a prior 
case involving a different plaintiff (i.e., no second bite at the apple) 
In the early years following BP-Amoco’s success in defeating class 
certification in the case of Watts v. Amoco Production Company,100 
different plaintiff counsel, representing a different plaintiff, sought 
certification of a royalty owner class against BP in a different Oklahoma 
county district court in spite of the earlier court’s denial of class 
certification in the Watts case. In Rees v. BP America Production Co.,101 the 
Oklahoma Court of Appeals found that the new attempt at certification of a 
class action lawsuit (i.e., the second bite at the apple so to speak) was 
precluded by the denial of class certification in the earlier Watts case. The 
reasoning applied by the Court of Appeals is explained in its opinion. 
Unit Petroleum encountered a like scenario after defeating class 
certification in the earlier case of Panola Independent School District No. 4 
v. Unit Petroleum Co.102 A different plaintiff lawyer, representing a 
different plaintiff, sought certification of a royalty owner class against Unit 
in a different court in Consul Properties, LLC v. Unit Petroleum Co.103 
In its Order of February 2, 2016, the U.S. District Court in Consul, citing 
and discussing the above-referenced Rees decision from 2008, dismissed 
the portion of the Consul case that requested class certification (apparently 
leaving the case pending only as to the individual claims of the named 
plaintiffs). The Court found, among other things, that “there is an identity 
                                                                                                                 
 99. Id. at 875. 
 100. 75 O.B.J. 2459 (Okla. App. 2004 - #98,782). 
 101. 211 P.3d 910 (Okla. App. 2008). 
 102. 287 P.3d 1033 (Okla. App. 2012). 
 103. Order dated February 2, 2016, in Case No. CIV-15-840-R, United States District 
Court for the Western District of Oklahoma. 
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of interest between the named plaintiffs in Panola and the named Plaintiffs 
in this [Consul] case sufficient to constitute privity. But in any event, 
Oklahoma as a matter of state law has clearly recognized [e.g., Rees v. BP 
America Production Co.] non-mutual defensive collateral estoppel or issue 
preclusion to apply in the circumstances of this case.” 
K. Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirms District Court ruling that the 
arbitration clauses in the subject oil and gas leases did not allow the 
royalty owners to seek class-wide arbitration. 
In Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC v. Scout Petroleum, LLC,104 
Chesapeake had entered into certain oil and gas leases covering property in 
Pennsylvania which contained the following arbitration clause: 
ARBITRATION. In the event of a disagreement between Lessor 
and Lessee concerning this Lease, performance thereunder, or 
damages caused by Lessee’s operations, the resolution of all 
such disputes shall be determined by arbitration in accordance 
with the rules of the American Arbitration Association.105 All 
fees and costs associated with the arbitration shall be borne 
equally by Lessor and Lessee. 
Scout Petroleum, LLC and Scout II, LP (collectively referred to as 
“Scout”) purchased the lessors’ rights under several of the above leases and 
thereafter received royalty payments from Chesapeake. In March of 2014, 
Scout filed an arbitration demand against Chesapeake on behalf of itself 
and similarly situated lessors, alleging that Chesapeake had underpaid 
royalties. In its answering statement filed with the American Arbitration 
Association (AAA), Chesapeake objected to the proposed class arbitration, 
asserting that it never agreed to resolve disputes arising out of the subject 
                                                                                                                 
 104. 809 F.3d 746 (3d Cir. 2016). On October 3, 2016, the United States Supreme Court 
denied certiorari review.  
 105. The court noted that, over the years, the American Arbitration Association (AAA) 
has adopted and amended more than 50 sets of active rules, including the Commercial 
Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures as well as the Supplementary Rules for Class 
Arbitrations. 809 F.3d at 749. The court further noted that AAA Commercial Rule 7 states in 
part that “[t]he arbitrator shall have the power to rule on his or her own jurisdiction, 
including any objections with respect to the existence, scope, or validity of the arbitration 
agreement or to the arbitrability of any claim or counterclaim.” Id. Commercial Rule 8 states 
in part that the arbitrator shall interpret and apply these rules insofar as they relate to the 
arbitrator’s powers and duties.” Id. at 750. Other provisions of the AAA rules were quoted 
by the court in its opinion, including provisions contemplating the possibility of class 
arbitrations. 
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leases through a class arbitration. Chesapeake additionally stated that it did 
not agree to submit the question of whether a class arbitration was 
maintainable under the leases for decision by the arbitrator (instead of the 
courts).  
Chesapeake promptly filed the present declaratory judgment action in 
April 2014 asking the federal district court to declare (1) that the district 
court, and not the arbitrators, must decide whether class arbitration was 
available, and (2) that the subject oil and gas leases do not permit class 
arbitration.  
In July 2014, in an unrelated lawsuit, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit (the court before which the present appeal was pending) 
issued its opinion in Opalinski v. Robert Half International Inc.106 The 
district court found that Opalinski changed the state of law in the Third 
Circuit by holding “for the first time, that ‘the availability of classwide 
arbitration is a substantive “question of arbitrability” to be decided by a 
court absent clear agreement otherwise.’ ”107  
On October 6, 2014, the three appointed arbitrators (all of whom were 
retired federal judges) issued a decision that noted the holding in Opalinski 
and found that the arbitration clauses in this case met the required standard 
and clearly and unmistakably authorized the panel to make the decision 
about arbitrability. Chesapeake filed motions to vacate the arbitrators’ 
ruling and to stay the arbitration until the federal district court ruled on 
Chesapeake’s pending request for a finding on the question of “who 
decides” whether the lease provisions allowed for class arbitrations. 
On October 16, 2014, the district court granted Chesapeake’s motion, it 
found that the court is to decide the issue of arbitrability and it vacated the 
arbitrator’s decision that they (rather than the court) should decide the issue 
of arbitrability of class-wide claims, finding that the arbitrators’ ruling was 
contrary to Opalinski: 
In its memorandum opinion, the District Court concluded that  
[t]he contract here is silent or ambiguous as to class arbitration, 
far from the ‘clear and unmistakable’ allowance needed for an 
arbitrator, and not a court, to turn to the clause construction 
question.”108 In reaching this conclusion, it relied in particular on 
                                                                                                                 
 106. 761 F.3d 326 (3d Cir. 2014). 
 107. Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C. v. Scout Petroleum, LLC, 73 F. Supp. 3d 488, 499 
(M.D. Pa. 2014) (quoting Opalinski, 761 F.3d at 329). 
 108. The Third Circuit explained that “the clause construction” inquiry is the question of 
whether the parties’ arbitration agreement permits class arbitration. 809 F.3d at 753. 
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this Court’s opinion in Opalinski as well as the Sixth Circuit’s 
decision in Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Crockett.109 
On appeal, Scout argued that the arbitration clauses contained in each of 
the leases expressly and unambiguously delegated the question of 
arbitrability to the arbitrators. In support of that assertion Scout urged that 
(1) the leases expressly stated that the arbitration would be conducted in 
accordance with the rules of the American Arbitration Association, (2) 
under Pennsylvania law, the arbitration provisions incorporated all of the 
AAA rules into the leases, as part of the parties’ agreement, as if fully 
printed in haec verba therein, and (3) the AAA’s Commercial and 
Supplementary Rules, as integral parts of the Leases, thereby clearly and 
unmistakably vested the arbitrators with the jurisdiction to decide the 
question of class arbitrability.110 However, the Third Circuit disagreed and 
held that the leases failed to satisfy the applicable onerous burden of 
overcoming the presumption in favor of judicial resolution of the question 
of arbitrability. 
The court did observe that “[v]irtually every circuit to have considered 
the issue has determined that incorporation of the [AAA] arbitration rules 
constitutes clear and unmistakable evidence that the parties agreed to 
arbitrate arbitrability. Like the District Court and Chesapeake, however, we 
believe that this ‘bilateral arbitration dispute case law’ is entitled to 
relatively little weight in the class arbitrability context. . . . [T]he whole 
notion of class arbitration implicates a particular set of concerns that are 
absent in the bilateral context.111  
Turning to the second question of whether the arbitration clauses in the 
oil and gas leases contemplated the ability to submit class-wide issues to 
arbitration, the Third Circuit found that “the Leases are, at least in a certain 
sense, ‘silent as to the availability of classwide arbitration. . . . [L]ike 
Opalinski and Reed Elsevier, the Leases do not expressly mention class 
arbitration, the availability of class arbitration, the Supplementary 
Rules . . .”112 
The court found that “the requisite contractual basis may not be inferred 
solely from the fact that the parties agreed to arbitrate or from their failure 
to prohibit this form [class arbitrations] of arbitration in their agreement.113 
                                                                                                                 
 109. 809 F.3d at 752. Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Crockett 734 F.3d 594 (6th Cir. 2013). 
 110. 809 F.3d at 753-54. 
 111. Id. at 764. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Sutter, 675 F.3d at 221, 224. 
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“‘[T]he differences between bilateral and class-arbitration are too great for 
arbitrators to presume . . . that the parties’ mere silence on the issue of 
class-action arbitration constitutes consent to resolve their disputes in class 
proceedings.’ ”114  
In addition to emphasizing the total absence of any reference to 
classwide arbitration in the arbitration clauses of the leases, the court also 
found it “significant that the Leases consistently use singular (and defined) 
terms to describe the respective parties to any arbitration proceeding and 
the dispute to be arbitrated.115 The Third Circuit noted that, in considering 
the arbitration clause in Reed [Elsevier], the Sixth Circuit looked only to 
whether there was an express reference to class arbitration in the arbitration 
clause. The court observed that, given its examination of both the language 
of the leases and the nature and contents of various AAA rules, it saw no 
reason to reach a different conclusion in the present case, and thereby create 
a split among the circuits.  
The Third Circuit affirmed the orders of the district court. 
L. Case to Note for Future Reference: Court addresses issues as to the 
“Standing” of the plaintiffs to assert certain claims in connection with 
alleged royalty underpayments in a proposed class action lawsuit, and the 
Court also discusses objections filed by both the plaintiffs and defendants to 
certain Expert Witness testimony proposed by the opposing parties. 
In a very lengthy opinion that we will not attempt to summarize in this 
paper, the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico in 
Abraham v. WPX Production, LLC116 addressed in detail a series of 
questions on whether the plaintiffs lacked standing to assert certain of their 
royalty underpayment claims.  
The court also addressed in the same order the objections the opposing 
parties had filed to the suitability of the proposed expert testimony to be 
offered by two well-known expert witnesses and/or participants in class 
action royalty lawsuits throughout the oil and gas producing states. This 
case should be noted for future reference in the event that issues on those 
same subjects arise in the reader’s present and future litigation. 
  
                                                                                                                 
 114. Id. at 221 (quoting Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S.Ct. at 1776). 
 115. 809 F.3d at 759-60.  
 116. 184 F. Supp. 3d (D. N.M. 2016). 
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III. Oil and Gas Lease Cancellation, Termination and Breach of Obligation 
Cases (Other Than Royalty) 
A. Court addresses claims of lease termination based on alleged failure to 
produce in paying quantities as to a well from which no oil or gas had been 
marketed for a period of some 17 years. 
The case of Concorde Resources Corp. v. Williams Production Mid-
Continent Co.,117 involved an oil and gas lease termination lawsuit. The 
Connor #1 gas well was drilled and completed in 1981 to the Booch 
formation and was shut-in in 1982. Concorde acquired the original oil and 
gas leases attributed to that well, which covered the SW/4, the N/2 SE/4, 
the SW/4 SE/4 and NW/4 of Section 12. Concorde acquired the original 
leases and the Connor #1 as part of a settlement of litigation. However, the 
assignment was not recorded either as a documented settlement or an 
official assignment of record. The prior owner did file with the Oklahoma 
Corporation Commission a notice of the change of operator. 
In 1990, Concorde acquired new oil and gas leases from the same lessors 
who were subject to the original leases. However, the new leases only 
covered the SW/4 of Section 12. The new leases were duly recorded in the 
real estate records. Concorde presented testimony at trial that the new leases 
were acquired in order to reduce the spacing and reduce the shut-in 
payments, and that the Connor #1 well had been capable of production in 
paying quantities since the time it was drilled and completed in 1981.  
The Court of Appeals noted that the two issues in this appeal were: (1) 
Whether the original leases and the new leases terminated because of the 
inability of the Connor #1 well to produce in paying quantities when it was 
“turned on” in July of 2008, and (2) whether Redbud E&P and its 
predecessors acquired the original leases as to certain formations as a result 
of an Oklahoma Corporation Commission pooling order. 
The history of the Connor #1 well, as shown by the testimony and 
evidence presented at trial, was as follows: 
The well was drilled and completed in 1981. 
Concorde deepened the well in 1990 to the Middle Booch formation, 
without success. 
From 1990 to 2008, Concorde did not perform any other activities in 
connection with the well other than checking well pressure, usually twice a 
year. The pressure reading was between 380 and 440 pounds. 
                                                                                                                 
 117. 379 P.3d 1157 (Okla. Civ. App. 2016).  
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Also during the same period of 1990 to 2008, Concorde did not expend 
funds for operation or maintenance of the well, and Concorde did not sell 
any gas from the well. Additionally, Concorde did no further exploration. 
Concorde did not dispute this period of inactivity. 
With there being no contrary evidence, Concorde maintained that there 
was no pipeline connection available until July 2008, and the trial court 
found that to be true. The parties stipulated for trial that Redbud was 
making no claim that the implied covenant to market had been breached. 
A pipeline became available in 2008. Concorde connected the well to the 
pipeline in July 2008, tested the line and waited for a gas sales contract. The 
well was turned on without any problem—such as water or any need for 
repairs—and gas was sold. 
A compressor was added which aided in transportation of the gas in the 
pipeline and had no function in enabling production.  
From about 1990, the well had a water tank and separator. Concorde 
replaced both in June 2008. The well was “turned on” and began producing 
gas. The well was not “loaded” with water and the water produced was 
consistent with water produced generally with gas production.  
Concorde’s records reflected 110 barrels of water during the first 
approximate 30 days of production in 2008. Redbud argues that this amount 
is excessive and shows that the well was in fact “loaded” with water. The 
trial court found that the water removal did not equate to adding additional 
equipment or repair. 
An expert and fact witness for Concorde presented rebuttal to the 
assertions of problems with the well and opined that the well was capable 
of producing gas in paying quantities when it was shut-in. He also testified 
that the compressor’s function was for transportation rather than 
production. However, on cross-examination, this witness testified that he 
did not know the capability of the well in 2008. He also stated that, without 
a separator, the gas purchaser would not purchase the gas with water 
content. 
The court of appeals’ opinion includes 8 more paragraphs summarizing 
the detailed testimony and other evidence presented at the trial, and 
reference is made to paragraphs 14 through 21 of that opinion for the 
remaining factual backdrop that was described in the opinion. 
The trial court held in favor of Concorde with regard to the lease issues 
and denied damages. Redbud appealed. 
In affirming in part, modifying in part and remanding the case back to 
the trial court with instructions, the court of appeals found in part as 
follows: 
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1. Title to the original leases and the new leases merged as to the SW/4 
of Section 12. “When a legal estate and an equitable estate are coextensive 
and become vested in the same person, there is a merger of the equitable 
estate in the legal estate and a consequent extinguishment of the equitable 
estate, and survival of the legal estate, absent any intent not to merge. First 
Federal Savings and Loan Ass'n, Chickasha, Oklahoma, 1992 OK 129, ¶ 5, 
839 P.2d at 1340.”118 
2. Here it is clear that Connor #1 produces gas in paying quantities. The 
contested issue in this case is whether the well had the ability to produce 
when the market became available in June 2008, rather than the actual 
production at a later time.119 The question in this case is whether the well 
had the ability to produce in paying quantities when the impediment (no 
pipeline) to marketing was removed.120 Redbud’s view of the evidence is 
that the Connor #1 required repair and additional equipment before it could 
be “turned on” and begin flowing gas. In addition, Redbud points to the 
total absence of any marketing of production for 17 years.  
3. The determination of whether a well is "capable of producing in 
paying quantities" involves equitable considerations conducted on a case-
by-case basis. Looking at the status of a well at a precise moment in time 
might overlook rational explanations of whether a well is, or is not, capable 
of producing in paying quantities. Here, it is clear that the trial court, 
expressly or implicitly, examined the facts pertinent to Connor #1 in 
accordance with the foregoing criterion. The trial court's conclusion that 
Connor #1 is a well capable of producing in paying quantities is not against 
the clear weight of the evidence or contrary to law.121 
4. As to Redbud’s claim that it acquired right in other formations by 
virtue of an Oklahoma Corporation Commission pooling order (a 
proceeding to which Concorde was a party), the court of appeals agreed that 
Redbud acquired the interests (outside the producing formation in the 
Connor #1 well) as to the force pooled Savanna, Red Fork, Hartshorne and 
Bartlesville formations. As a result, the trial court’s judgment quieting title 
in Concorde was directed to be modified to exclude those formations from 
the ownership findings in favor of Concorde.  
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B. Landowners seek preliminary injunction prohibiting Lessee from 
terminating its supply of natural gas via farm taps under the “Free Gas 
Clauses” of the oil and gas leases. 
The landowner plaintiffs in Lee v. ConocoPhillips Company122 sued 
ConocoPhillips (Conoco) to enforce their interpretation of the free gas 
clauses contained in the underlying oil and gas leases. Those clauses 
permitted 
lessors to have gas free of charge from any gas well on the 
leased premises for stoves and inside lights in the principal 
dwelling house on said land by making their own connections 
with the well, the use of said gas to be at the lessors’ sole risk 
and expense. 
The gas was to be provided in its raw, natural state, at its natural pressure. 
Residential gas lines, farm taps and domestic taps, were built and connected 
from the landowners’ properties to Conoco’s wellheads to allow the 
landowners to take and use the raw gas. Throughout the period leading up 
to the proceedings in this case, Conoco provided the landowners with 
natural gas, free of charge, pursuant to the free gas lease provisions. The 
decision of the court recounts in detail the factual history of free gas use by 
the landowners, and safety concerns of Conoco, and the efforts of Conoco 
to buy-out the free gas rights in order to terminate the provision of raw free 
gas to the landowners. The court notes in its decision that “Conoco’s 
initiatives have been generally successful; most farm taps on its wells in 
Oklahoma have been eliminated. Only the farm taps involved in the present 
litigation remain.”123 
During the period leading up to the filing of the landowners’ lawsuit, 
Conoco had expressed growing concerns about the risks associated with the 
landowners’ taking and use of untreated, unodorized gas, and whether the 
landowners were complying with federal and state rules and regulations that 
applied to the facilities they constructed to transport the free gas to their 
property. It urged the landowners to find alternate sources for natural gas, 
and offered a financial payout. When those communications failed to lead 
the landowners to end their use of the free gas option, Conoco notified 
certain of the plaintiff landowners that it was going to disconnect their farm 
taps by a specified date due to the volatile mixture of untreated elements in 
the gas, and it provided a list of alternate providers of gas. Other 
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 123. Id. at *3. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2017
464 Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal [Vol. 2 
  
 
landowners were advised that their taps would be disconnected unless they 
provided proof that they were in compliance with specified regulations of 
the U.S. Department of Transportation that are administered by the 
Oklahoma Corporation Commission. 
As the landowners approached the deadline by which their taps were 
apparently going to be disconnected, they filed suit in the state district court 
of Texas County, Oklahoma and sought injunctive relief with respect to the 
intended disconnection of the taps. The landowners further sought a 
declaratory judgment that Conoco was required to comply with its 
contractual obligation to make natural gas available to landowners. Conoco 
removed the case to federal court and sought declaratory relief that, inter 
alia, it was not obligated to continue providing natural gas under the leases, 
due to stated concerns, and that it could turn off, disconnect and disable the 
farm taps without liability to the landowners.  
Before the court in this decision was the landowners’ motion for a 
preliminary injunction prohibiting Conoco from terminating the supply of 
natural gas via the farm taps during the pendency of the lawsuit. The court 
analyzed the pertinent factors required in order for a preliminary injunction 
to be granted as follows: 
As to whether the landowners had shown a likelihood of success on the 
merits, the court cited the earlier decision of the U.S. District Court in 
Kansas in Schell v. OXY U.S.A., Inc.124 The court in Schell found that since 
the free gas clause provided that the lessors were entitled to free gas for 
domestic purposes, this necessarily meant free “useable” gas, and that the 
“sole risk and expense” (of lessor) wording only came into play after the 
lessee fulfilled its obligation to provide the lessors with free, useable gas for 
domestic purposes.125 The court in the present Lee case likewise found that 
the subject leases were ambiguous but that, construing the lease language 
most strongly against the lessee, the free gas clauses required the lessee to 
provide the landowners with free, useable gas. 
The court additionally found that the landowners’ right to free gas was 
part of the consideration for, and a right granted by, the underlying oil and 
gas leases and that the lessee could not disregard its obligations out of mere 
inconvenience or expense. “Conoco’s argument regarding the added risks is 
not substantially different from the attendant risks it has in conducting its 
exploration and production activities.”126 
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The court next it did not “interpret Conoco’s purported obligation to 
ensure Landowners’ lines are in regulatory compliance to mean it can 
arbitrarily shut off the farm taps and permanently discontinue service in 
violation of its contractual obligation to provide free useable gas. This is 
especially true where Conoco has been providing such services for years 
without substantial interference or interruption.”127 
As a final finding in evaluating the landowners’ likelihood of success on 
the merits, the court concluded that “the fact Landowners may use the gas 
for purposes other than that specified in the leases does not, in the Court’s 
view, constitute a material breach that would justify the cessation of such 
rights, since ‘[t]he fact that the lessor has used gas for unauthorized 
purposes does not affect the right to free gas for authorized purposes.’ See 4 
KUNTZ, supra at 374. In sum, the likelihood of success factor weighs in 
Landowners’ favor.”128 
In assessing the required showing of “irreparable harm” in order to 
obtain a preliminary injunction, the court stated  
damages may be measured by either using the value of the gas 
which should have been provided or the difference in the value 
of the property with or without the free gas. Also, evidence at the 
preliminary injunction hearing showed the production life of a 
well may be determined by using the ‘decline curve’ 
methodology.” Moreover, ample evidence was introduced which 
establishes that Landowners have available to them alternate 
means of obtaining natural gas of the option of converting their 
fuel supply to propane. Of course, the utilization of either 
alternative is an exercise for which monetary damages would 
suffice to make Landowners whole. . .129  
Since the landowners failed to make an adequate showing of irreparable 
harm, the court found that it did not need to consider the remaining factors 
that must be shown in order to obtain a preliminary injunction. 
However, the court noted in concluding its decision that if the lessee 
chose to act on its stated intent to shut off the landowners’ farm taps even 
pending final adjudication of the case, “the court directs Conoco to 
reasonably assist Landowners in locating and connecting an alternative 
source of energy, and to temporarily refrain from shutting off the farm taps 
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for a reasonable time in order to allow such alternative sources to be put in 
place.”130 
C. Summary judgment ruling terminating oil and gas lease under its 90-day 
cessation of production clause is reversed based upon finding of disputed 
issues of material fact. 
In Brammer Petroleum, Inc. v. Bagley Minerals, L.P.,131 the trial court 
had entered summary judgment in favor of Bagley based on a finding that 
three oil and gas leases terminated because Brammer failed to commence 
operations for more than 90 days after a cessation of production, as required 
under the lease terms. On appeal, Brammer asserted that the trial court 
improperly struck from the record a portion of Larry Brammer’s affidavit, 
there was a disputed issue of fact as to whether Bagley had denied 
Brammer access to the well, there was a disputed issue of fact as to whether 
there was a cessation of production for more than 90 days, and Bagley 
failed to plead and prove the elements of their trespass-to-try-title claim. 
In reversing and remanding the case based upon a finding that whether 
production ceased for more than 90 days remained a disputed issue of fact, 
the Texas Court of Appeals focused on the fact that the contract pumper for 
the well at issue presented records showing that there was no production 
from the well in May, June and July 2013. However, the summary 
judgment record also included the pumper’s deposition testimony. In the 
deposition, the pumper was shown, and acknowledged, documents placed 
in front of him that showed 69 Mcf of gas produced and disposed of in July 
of 2013. Since a reasonable fact finder could infer from the deposition 
testimony that there was production from the well in July 2013, the 
summary judgment ruling was reversed and the case was remanded for 
further proceedings. 
IV. Oil and Gas Contracts, Transactions and Title Matters 
A. Appellate Court affirms holding by the District Court that an AMI letter 
agreement was invalid under the Rule Against Perpetuities. 
In American Natural Resources, LLC v. Eagle Rock Energy Partners, 
L.P.,132 the two primary questions before the Court were (1) whether a 
clause in an agreement giving American Natural (ANR) the right to 
participate in all future wells on unleased property violates Article II, 
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Section 32 of the Oklahoma Constitution prohibiting perpetuities, and (2) 
whether a limited liability company is a “life in being” for purposes of that 
provision of the Oklahoma Constitution. 
The agreement at issue in this case was a 2005 letter agreement 
contained the following provision which allowed ANR the right to 
participate in future wells (the “Option Provision”): 
2. In all subsequent wells within the AMI, ANR shall have the 
right to participate in the prospect area with a twenty-five 
percent (25%) working interest . . .  
ANR alleged in this suit that the defendants drilled and completed 17 wells 
in the AMI without allowing ANR to participate, and that the defendants 
thereby breached the above obligation under the agreement. ANR sued for 
(1) damages for alleged breach of contract, (2) damages for intentional 
interference with prospective economic benefits, and (3) a declaratory 
decree from the Court finding that ANR was entitled to participate in future 
wells drilled under the AMI since the date of the agreement. The defendants 
moved to dismiss the lawsuit, alleging that the Rule Against Perpetuities 
prevented ANR from enforcing the Option Provision. ANR responded that 
the Rule Against Perpetuities does not apply to oil and gas operating 
agreements and does not apply to the Option Provision because oil and gas 
production is always of limited duration.  
The district court granted the motion to dismiss based upon the Rule 
Against Perpetuities. ANR appealed. The Oklahoma Court of Appeals 
remanded the case to the district court so that ANR could amend its 
pleadings and for a determination of “whether, if alleged, a personal 
contract and a specific or perpetual organization life, together or separately, 
suffice to create an exception to the application of the Rule Against 
Perpetuities as set out in Producers Oil Co. v. Gore, 1980 OK 62, 610 P.2d 
772.”133 
In vacating the Court of Appeals’ decision and affirming the district 
court’s dismissal of the case, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held in part as 
follows: 
In rejecting the contention that the Option Agreement was inherently 
limited in duration, the court observed that the Option Agreement in this 
case was not part of a JOA or an oil and gas lease. The option did not expire 
when an existing lease expires, but instead continues when new leases are 
executed with new wells to be drilled on those leases. The AMI agreement 
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in this case was found to be a stand-alone document Simply put, “the 
Option Provision provides for ANR to participate in wells infinitum and is 
subject to the rule against perpetuities.”134 
Additionally, the court found that ANR, as a Limited Liability Company, 
could not be a life in being under the Rule. It further stated that, when there 
is no measureable life in being (such as with a corporation or an LLC), “the 
only definite period permitted by the rule against perpetuities is a term not 
exceeding 21 years.”135 Thus, “the Option Period was subject to the twenty-
one year limit imposed by the rule against perpetuities and [the Melcher 
case]. ANR’s right to participate in future wells is indeterminable, does not 
vest within the twenty-one year limit, and may never vest. Thus, the Option 
Provision violates the rule against perpetuity.”136 
B. Court resolves disputes regarding the effect of Pugh Clauses contained 
in the oil and gas leases. 
In Natural Gas Anadarko Company v. Venable,137 the plaintiff NGAC 
sued the defendant-lessors for a judicial determination as to the scope of 
NGAC’s remaining leasehold rights under the “Pugh clauses” contained in 
NGAC’s leases. The Pugh clauses stated in primary part as follows: 
2. Lessee agrees to release any portion of the leased premises not 
included in a producing unit or is not currently being drilled on a 
unit as designated by the Corporation Commission upon the 
expiration of the primary term of this lease . . .  
NGAC asserted that it continued to hold all the common sources of supply 
at all depths within its leases by production from those two wells and two 
formations. However, lessors maintained that the 1eases expired at the end 
of their primary term as to all common sources of supply that were not 
producing on that date. In substance, NGAC alleged that the clause was a 
“vertical” Pugh clause that kept the leases in effect as to all zones or 
formations within the 640-acre geographic area where the two wells were 
producing from two common sources of supply or formations. In contrast, 
the lessors asserted that it was a “horizontal” Pugh clause that caused the 
leases to terminate as to all formations that were not within the Oklahoma 
Corporation Commission-established common source(s) of supply 
producing at the end of the primary term. 
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Both the trial court and Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the lessors. 
The appellate court distinguished the prior decision in Rist v. Westhoma Oil 
Co.138 on the basis that the Pugh clause in this case contained restrictive 
language not found in the Pugh clause under consideration in Rist. The 
court found that the clause here “clearly expresses the intent of the parties 
to prohibit lease continuation as to unproductive units.” 
C. Court determines whether prevailing parties in quiet title action were 
entitled to recover their attorney fees and costs under the Nonjudicial 
Marketable Title Procedures Act. 
The decision in Natural Gas Anadarko Company v. Venable,139 involved 
the appeal of the district court’s judgment awarding costs and attorney fees 
to the Venable defendants after they prevailed on the merits in the quiet title 
action described in the preceding case summary of this paper. In that 
appeal, the court held that Anadarko’s leases expired at the end of the 
primary term with respect to the one nonproducing drilling and spacing unit 
designated by the Oklahoma Corporation Commission but not as to the two 
producing units. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment 
quieting title in the Venable defendants as to the nonproducing drilling and 
spacing unit. 
Anadarko’s appeal of the award of attorney fees and costs challenged the 
Venable defendants’ statutory entitlement to costs and attorney fees under 
the Nonjudicial Marketable Title Procedures Act (NMTPA).140 Anadarko 
contended that the attorney fee portion of the Act does not apply. Anadarko 
argued that attorney fees are authorized only if a party prevails on its entire 
claim. Anadarko noted that although it did not obtain the relief it sought, it 
did obtain some relief--i.e., the validity of its leases as to the two producing 
formations was confirmed. 
In affirming the district court’s award of attorney fees and costs to the 
Venable defendants under the NMTPA, the court found in part as follows: 
The court began its analysis by describing the purposes and policies that 
underlie the NMTPA as follows: 
The Nonjudicial Marketable Title Procedures Act "sets forth 
detailed procedures to be followed where someone having an 
interest or claiming an interest in a parcel of real property and 
who believes there is some title defect or apparent cloud on the 
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title to the real property, seeks to remedy same without having to 
institute a court action to quiet title." Head v. McCracken, 2004 
OK 84, ¶ 17, 102 P.3d 670, 681. The Act "seeks to preserve 
judicial resources by encouraging resolution of title disputes 
through curative instruments rather than through quiet title 
actions. It accomplishes this purpose by requiring a trial court to 
award attorney fees, costs, and expenses to a prevailing party in 
a quiet title action who attempted to first resolve the matter 
through a curative instrument in accordance with the Act." 
Stump, 2007 OK 97, ¶ 9, 179 P.3d at 611.141 
With regard to the above-referenced argument of Anadarko that it did 
obtain some relief in this action which should preclude an award of fees and 
costs against Anadarko, the court first agreed with the trial court’s prior 
finding that the validity of Anadarko’s leases as to the two producing 
formations was never an issue in the case. Rather, what Anadarko sought 
was clear and uncontested title to the nonproducing formation. On that 
issue, the Venable defendants prevailed. The Venable defendants were 
correct in refusing to execute the curative document requested by Anadarko 
before the lawsuit was filed. The court found that Anadarko “must win . . . 
through the quiet title court proceedings that which they sought through 
their written demand.”142 
Second, the court found that Anadarko could not recover attorney fees 
pursuant to the NMTPA unless “a defendant refuses to execute a curative 
instrument that is actually necessary to cure the title problem.”143 However, 
no similar restriction is placed on a defendant who defeats only a portion of 
the plaintiff’s quiet title action. The NMTPA authorizes recovery of 
attorney fees by a quiet title defendant who correctly “failed or refused” to 
take the corrective action demanded by the plaintiff in its pre-lawsuit 
request.144 
With regard to the entitlement to recover costs, the court noted that 
Anadarko’s opposition to the recovery of costs incorrectly relief on the 
wrong statutory provision—i.e., 12 O.S. § 942, which lists the costs the 
district court may award. The Venable defendants instead relied on section 
1141.5(B) of the NMTPA which, as the more specific of the two costs 
statutes, controls. In the NMTPA, the legislature did not limit a successful 
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defendant to recovering only “costs.” Rather, the legislature also authorized 
a successful defendant to recover the “actual expenses incurred” and the 
“expenses of litigation directly related to obtaining judgment.”145 As a 
result, the district court did not err in awarding the Venable defendants 
additional expenses not authorized as costs by 12 O.S. § 942. 
The district court’s award of attorney fees, costs and expenses to the 
Venable defendants was affirmed. 
D. Court addresses dispute as to whether party seeking to enforce rights 
under Area of Mutual Interest (AMI) Agreement had already assigned away 
its rights in the subject property. 
In Burlington Resources Oil & Gas Company, LP v. Petromax Operating 
Co., Inc.,146 Burlington claimed an interest in certain leases and claimed 
rights in an Area of Mutual Interest. The Petromax defendants responded 
that Burlington no longer owned any interest in the AMI because it had 
previously executed a 1994 assignment that conveyed its rights in the AMI 
and subject leases to another party. Burlington countered that the 
assignment in question only conveyed Burlington’s interest in 4 wells and 
reserved the remaining interests in the leasehold estates. The trial court 
granted summary judgment in favor of the Petromax defendants. Burlington 
appealed. 
After reviewing the AMI provisions, conveyancing language and other 
terms of the series of contracts and assignments at issue, the Texas Court of 
Appeals found that the 1994 assignment was unambiguous and it affirmed 
the trial court’s summary judgment decision in favor of Petromax. In 
reaching that outcome, certain of the more notable findings of the court 
were as follows: 
Arguments based on custom in the industry and trade usage, as aids to 
contract construction, are not used unless a contract is ambiguous.147 
A reservation of minerals to be effective must be by clear language. 
Courts do not favor reservations by implication.148 
The practical distinction between a reservation and exception is 
questionable today, citing Williams & Meyers, Oil and Gas Law 336 (2008) 
(distinction between exceptions and reservations has lost most of its 
importance in contemporary law).149 
                                                                                                                 
 145. Id. (citing 12 O.S. § 1141.5(B)). 
 146. 486 S.W.3d 703 (Tex. App. 2016). 
 147. Id. at 714. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. at fn. 9. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2017
472 Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal [Vol. 2 
  
 
E. Texas Supreme Court Court reverses the 2014 Decision of the Court of 
Appeals which found that the subject assignment did not provide for 
“proportionate reduction” of a reserved production payment in the event of 
the expiration of 2 of the 4 underlying oil and gas leases. 
In McDaniel Partners, Ltd. v. Apache Deepwater, LLC,150 the dispute 
that was earlier presented to the Texas Court of Appeals involved a 
production payment reserved to the assignor under the terms of a 1953 
assignment that covered 4 oil and gas leases. A parenthetical clause in the 
assignment described the manner of calculating the payment. The issue 
presented was whether the expiration of two of the four oil and gas leases 
should modify the manner of computing the production payment.  
The precise language of the reserved production payment was as follows: 
“there is expressly excepted from this conveyance as a 
‘production payment interest,’ the title to and ownership of . . . 
(1/16th of 35/64ths of 7/8ths, being one sixteenth of the entire 
interest in the production from said lands to which Assignor 
claims to be entitled under the terms of said respective oil and 
gas leases) of the total oil, gas, casinghead gas and other 
minerals in and under and which may be produced from the 
above described land, i.e., from each and both of said Surveys 36 
and 37, Block 40, Township 5 South, T&P Ry. Co. Lands, until 
the net proceeds of said reserved interest . . .”151 (Emphasis 
added by the court) 
The 35/64 fraction represented the fact that the portion of the minerals 
attributable to each of the 4 leases at the time of the conveyance and 
reservation was as follows: 
  Cowden 36 lease: 16/64 of the total; 
  Cowden 37 lease: 16/64 of the total; 
  Peterman lease: 1/64 of the total; and 
  Broudy lease: 2/64 of the total. 
In 1994, the Cowden 36 lease and Cowden 37 lease expired for lack of 
production. However, production continued as to the other 2 leases, with 
Apache commencing additional wells on those other leases. 
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Apache sent a Division Order to McDaniel showing that McDaniel was 
entitled to 1/16 of 3/64 of 7/8 of the production from the remaining 2 
leases. McDaniel, in contrast, asserted that his production payment should 
continue to be computed as 1/16 of 35/64 of 7/8 of the production from the 
2 remaining leases.  
McDaniel sued Apache for breach of contract, conversion and for an 
accounting. At trial, neither party asserted that the subject assignment was 
ambiguous. The trial court found that the expiration of 2 of the original 4 
leases should lead to a proportionate reduction of the production payment. 
McDaniel appealed. 
In reversing the judgment of the trial court and ruling in favor of 
McDaniel, the 2014 decision of the Texas Court of Appeals found in part as 
follows: 
The Texas Court of Appeals found that the single issue for review was 
whether the trial court correctly interpreted the production payment 
reservation under the 1953 Assignment. The appellate court concluded that 
the “exacting, ‘longhand’ description of the interest”152 reserved 
unambiguously provided a precise fractional equation by which the 
production payment was to be computed: 1/16 of 35/64 of 7/8 of 
production. It was likewise unambiguous that the entire fractional equation 
was to be calculated against the total production from all of the lands. 
The Texas Court of Appeals noted that the foregoing findings left the 
question of whether the terms of the assignment permitted a reduction of 
the production payment in the event any of the assigned leases expired. The 
parties and the court focused upon the following wording from the excerpt 
from the assignment quoted above: “(1/16th of 35/64ths of 7/8ths, being one 
sixteenth of the entire interest in the production from said lands to which 
Assignor claims to be entitled under the terms of said respective oil and gas 
leases).” Apache argued that this language explained how to compute the 
production payment at any particular point in time---i.e., based on the 
amount of working interest acreage that is then attributable to the 
underlying leases. 
The Texas Court of Appeals rejected Apache’s contention and found that 
there was no language in the assignment providing for any adjustments, in 
the event of oil and gas lease termination, to either (a) the production 
payment’s $3,550,000 dollar sum, or (b) the production payment’s 
volumetric total of 1,420,000 barrels of oil. The court noted that if the 
parties had intended to periodically adjust the production payment, the 
                                                                                                                 
 152. Id. at 535. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2017
474 Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal [Vol. 2 
  
 
assignment surely would have included language providing for the 
adjustment of those numbers. 
Finally, the Texas Court of Appeals observed that while certain legal 
scholars had opined that a production payment interest expires with the 
termination of the underlying oil and gas leases, it could find no prior Texas 
case deciding whether a production payment (absent express contractual 
language) can be proportionately reduced following the expiration of some, 
but not all, of the underlying leases. 
In its 2016 decision in Apache Deepwater, LLC v. McDaniel Partners, 
Ltd.,153 the Texas Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of 
Appeals and rendered judgment in favor of Apache. In doing so, some of 
the more notable findings of the court were as follows: 
Ultimately, the nature of the particular production payment at issue here, 
and its burden on the underlying leasehold estates, rests on what the 
assignment says, not on what a party argues it should have said.154 
Neither the inclusion of the four leases in a single instrument nor the 
instrument’s statement of the leases’ cumulative working interest as a single 
fraction demonstrates that the parties intended the production payment to be 
carved from something other than the estates conveyed. To the contrary, the 
explanatory phrase that follows the stated fraction ties the 1/16 reservation 
to the assignor’s interest in the “respective” leases, indicating that the 
reserved interest pertains to the particular leases separately.155  
Absent express language in the assignment to the contrary, we apply the 
general rule that “when an oil and gas lease terminates, the overriding 
royalty [or similar production payment] created in an assignment of the 
lease is likewise extinguished.”156 Applying that rule to the unambiguous 
language of this assignment, we conclude that the trial court rendered the 
correct judgment in the case. 
The Texas Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ judgment and 
rendered judgment that McDaniel take nothing. 
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F. Court dismisses appeal, finding that the defendant’s sale of the 
underlying oil and gas leases during the pendency of its appeal of a 
declaratory judgment ruling concerning alleged “free gas” rights of the 
plaintiff-landowner class rendered the appeal moot. 
The events surrounding the appellate proceedings in Schell v. OXY USA 
Inc.157 presented the not-uncommon situation of a litigant selling assets that 
are at issue in a lawsuit during the pendency of the litigation. The less-
common aspect of the facts in this case, which led to a complex series of 
rulings by the Tenth Circuit, was that the only substantive judgment on 
appeal was a declaration as to the future rights and obligations of OXY 
relating to the assigned oil and gas leases, with no judgment for damages or 
other relief as to past actions of the defendant. 
In this case, OXY appealed from the grant of summary judgment in favor 
of the plaintiff-landowner class “on the question of whether their oil and 
gas leases required OXY to make ‘free gas’ useable for domestic 
purposes.”158 OXY also appealed the district court’s certification of the 
plaintiff class, the denial of OXY’s motion to decertify the class and the 
district court’s order quashing the deposition of an absent class member. 
The landowner class moved to dismiss the appeal as moot. OXY opposed 
dismissal based on mootness, and argued that if the court should find 
mootness, the court should vacate the district court’s declaratory judgment 
in favor of the plaintiff class. 
The underlying lawsuit was filed in 2007 by four oil and gas leaseholders 
on behalf of a proposed class seeking, among other relief, a declaratory 
judgment based on the alleged failure of OXY to supply free useable gas 
under the applicable oil and gas leases. The district court “certified a class 
of ‘all surface owners of Kansas land burdened by oil and gas leases held or 
operated by OXY USA, Inc. which contain a free gas clause.’”159 The 
plaintiffs ultimately sought only declaratory relief, and not damages for past 
time periods, when it became apparent that OXY had continued to provide 
free gas during prior periods so that the plaintiffs had no damage claims.160 
The district court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and 
denied OXY’s motion for summary judgment. Specifically, the court 
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granted the landowner plaintiffs “declaratory relief requiring OXY to 
provide free useable gas under the contract.”161 
OXY appealed the declaratory judgment of the district court. However, 
after filing the appeal, but before the appeal briefs were due, OXY sold all 
of its interests in the Kansas leases to Merit Hugoton, L.P. (Merit). In light 
of that sale, the plaintiffs moved the court to dismiss the appeal as moot.  
The court allowed the appeal to proceed forward with briefing and oral 
argument. One week after oral argument, Merit filed a motion to intervene 
as an appellant. That motion was denied,162 leaving the case presented for 
decision by the Tenth Circuit. The court began the ruling portion of its 
opinion with the holding:  
We conclude that this appeal is moot. OXY has sold all of its 
interests in the leases; therefore, its conduct cannot be affected 
by a declaratory judgment concerning these same oil and gas 
leases. Accordingly, we grant the motion of the plaintiff class to 
dismiss this appeal. 
In reaching the above holding and other related rulings, some of the more 
notable issues and findings included the following: 
The court noted that the doctrine of mootness, in the declaratory-
judgment context, “looks to whether the requested relief will actually alter 
the future conduct of the named parties.”163 Citing a prior Tenth Circuit 
opinion, the court found that “[t]he crucial question is whether granting a 
present determination of the issues offered will have some effect in the real 
world.” Rio Grande Silvery Minnow, 601 F.3d at 1110 (quoting Wyoming v. 
U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 414 F.3d 1207, 1212 (10th Cir.2005)).” 
Applying the above mootness principles to the facts of this case, the 
court found that 
the declaratory judgment at issue in this litigation—“that OXY is 
required to provide useable gas pursuant to the terms of the Free 
Gas Covenant without interruption,” Aplt.App. at 795—cannot 
affect OXY’s behavior because it is no longer bound by the 
leases and no longer operates the wells in question. OXY is 
                                                                                                                 
 161. Id.  
 162. The court noted at various points in its opinion that the parties had declined to enter 
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completely unaffected by our interpretation of contractual 
provisions (i.e., the free gas clauses) in contracts that no longer 
bind OXY.164 
The court stated that OXY’s only argument against mootness was that 
OXY continued to have an interest in the outcome of this lawsuit “due to 
the potential preclusive effects of the declaratory judgment.”165 The court 
stated that it regarded such concerns over “the effects of this judgment in 
hypothetical unfiled future litigation—to be not a legally cognizable interest 
that will defeat mootness.”166 
The court went on to observe that “[e]ven if OXY had breached the 
contracts in the past, our ruling today on the meaning of the free gas clauses 
cannot change its present behavior (because it no longer operates the wells) 
and cannot change its past behavior.”167 
Having determined that the appeal would be dismissed, the court next 
determined if it would grant OXY’s request that, if the court were to 
dismiss the appeal over OXY’s objections based on mootness, the court 
should then also vacate the district court’s declaratory judgment in favor of 
the plaintiff class. The court noted that “when a case becomes moot on 
appeal, the ordinary course is to vacate the judgment below and remand 
with directions to dismiss.”168 However, when the appeal becomes moot as 
a result of “a voluntary act of one of the parties, we generally act to prevent 
a party from taking advantage of mootness that the party caused”169 by 
refusing to vacate the district court’s judgment. While those are the general 
practices, “[e]quitable principles keep us from applying this standard in a 
rigid fashion.”170 
In applying the principles recognized in its opinion, the court found that, 
after considering the equities in this case where OXY’s voluntary action 
caused the appeal to be moot, vacating the district court’s judgment would 
not be appropriate: 
OXY protests that it did not “enter[ ] into this $1.4 billion sale of 
regional assets for the purpose of mooting one appeal,” . . . We 
cannot say that the fact that OXY may have undertaken a sale for 
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other reasons requires us to “allow that party to eliminate its loss 
without an appeal and to deprive the winning party of the 
judicial protection it has fairly won.”171 
Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit dismissed the appeal without disturbing the 
district court’s declaratory judgment.172 
G. Texas Supreme Court determines that the requirement of “reasonable 
certainty of proof” applies even where lost profits are not sought as 
damages and are instead used to determine the market value of property for 
which recovery is sought, and court addresses formalities of contracting. 
The Texas Court of Appeals’ decision in the long-pending proceedings 
in Phillips v. Carlton Energy Group, LLC173 was summarized in the 2012 
edition of this annual report. Under the facts in this case, CBM Energy had 
entered into a contract with the government of Bulgaria in October of 2000 
that permitted CBM to explore for natural gas on a large tract of land in 
Bulgaria. In order to obtain financing to fulfill its obligations under the 
Bulgarian concession, CBM entered into an agreement with Carlton on 
April 25, 2003, under which Carlton was to provide phased payments 
totaling $8 million in exchange for a large interest in the project. In an 
effort to obtain additional funding in the summer of 2004 to support its 
payment obligations, Carlton submitted a proposed agreement to Phillips 
under which Phillips would agree to pay $8.5 million in exchange for a 
10% interest in the project. Ultimately, Phillips did not provide any funding 
to Carlton and Phillips later asserted that, contrary to Carlton’s contentions, 
it never entered into a contract with Carlton. In particular, Phillips alleged 
that it signed the proposed letter agreement and returned it to Carlton for it 
to sign and accept. Phillips asserted that Carlton never returned to him a 
counterpart of the contract signed by Carlton. 
Carlton later learned that in the Fall of 2004, during the period when 
Carlton was providing Phillips with technical data concerning the project 
during their negotiations, “Phillips and his representatives, without 
Carlton’s knowledge, were in direct contact with CBM about the Bulgaria 
Project.”174 Carlton alleged that Phillips was taking action to supplant 
                                                                                                                 
 171. Id. at 456-57 (citing Mfrs. Hanover Trust Co. v. Yanakas, 11 F.3d 381, 383. (2d Cir. 
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 172. The court does state in footnote 10 of its opinion that its decision to not vacate the 
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Carlton’s position with CBM in relation to the project. In February 2005, 
EurEnergy, a company connected to Phillips, made a proposal to CBM and 
then entered into a joint development agreement under which EurEnergy 
provided funding to CBM for the project. As part of that contract, CBM 
agreed to declare Carlton in default of its obligations under the 
CBM/Carlton contract, and Carlton did so. “CBM and EurEnergy’s 
relationship subsequently soured, and litigation between CBM and 
EurEnergy ensued.”175 Bulgaria thereafter terminated the concession it had 
granted to CBM.  
Based on the complex factual history described in the court’s opinion, 
Carlton sued Phillips, EurEnergy and several other Phillips-related entities 
for tortious interference with the CBM/Carlton agreement, and for breach 
of contract and related claims. After a lengthy trial, the jury found that 
Phillips did in fact enter into a contract with Carlton and breached that 
contract. The jury awarded actual damages in the amount of $66.5 million. 
The jury further found that Phillips and EurEnergy intentionally interfered 
with the CBM/Carlton agreement, and that Carlton suffered $66.5 million 
in actual damages on that claim. The jury also awarded $8.5 million in 
punitive damages against Phillips and awarded the same amount against 
EurEnergy. The trial court, sua sponte, suggested a remittitur in the amount 
of $31.16 million, finding that the award of $66.5 million in actual damages 
was not supported by factually-sufficient evidence. The court, in its 
judgment on the jury verdict, awarded Carlton the reduced amount of 
$31.16 million in actual damages. The judgment assessed punitive damages 
in the amount of $8.5 million against Phillips, with the same award against 
EurEnergy. The defendants appealed. 
In reversing the judgment of the trial court in part, the court of appeals 
first concluded that Carlton had submitted ample evidence to support the 
jury’s conclusions with respect to the tortious interference claim. The court 
of appeals found that the trial court erred in requiring a remittitur from 
$66.5 million to $31.16 million. So it “rendered judgment on the verdict, 
awarding Carlton the $66.5 million actual damages found by the jury,”176 
together with exemplary damages. 
The Texas Supreme Court in Phillips v. Carlton Energy Group, LLC,177 
affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the court of appeals. In 
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reaching that outcome, some of the more significant rulings of the court 
included the following: 
Phillips emphasized on appeal on the lack of evidence that Carlton ever 
signed and returned to Phillips’ the modified version of the contract that 
Phillips returned to Carlton as Phillips’ counter-offer. Phillips contended 
that Carlton’s failure to sign and return the revised version of the proposed 
agreement meant that there was no binding contract, contrary to the finding 
of the jury. The court noted that, in the weeks that followed Phillips’ 
counter-offer to Carlton, both parties behaved in certain respects as if they 
had an agreement, although the court recognized that certain aspects of the 
parties’ conduct also suggested that they had not entered into a contract. 
Moreover, the court cited its prior holding that signature and delivery are 
not essential elements for the formation of a contract: 
Texas law recognizes that a contract need not be signed to be 
“executed” unless the parties explicitly require signatures as a 
condition of mutual assent. If a written draft of an agreement is 
prepared, submitted to both parties, and each of them expresses 
his unconditional assent thereto, there is a written contract.178 
The court found that the evidence supported the jury’s finding that a 
contract was formed. 
The court additionally discussed the rule in Texas that lost profits can be 
recovered as consequential damages only when the amount is proved with 
reasonable certainty.179 However, it found that the court had never spoken 
to the issue of whether the  
requirement of reasonable certainty of proof should apply when 
lost profits are not sought as damages themselves but are used to 
determine the market value of property for which recovery is 
sought.180 
Finding that the purpose of the rule is to prevent recovery based on 
speculation, the court concluded that it would make no sense to not apply 
the rule in these circumstances. It observed that the “law is wisely skeptical 
of claims of lost profits from untested ventures or in unpredictable 
circumstances, which in reality are little more than wishful thinking.”181 
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However, it added that the law should “be no more skeptical of claimed 
market losses than the market itself is.”182 
The judgment of the court of appeals was affirmed in part and reversed 
in part, and the case was remanded for further proceedings, including a 
determination of damages in a manner consistent with the court’s opinion. 
On remand to the Texas Court of Appeals in Carlton Energy Group, 
LLC v. Phillips,183 that court reviewed the evidence presented at trial and 
concluded “that the evidence supporting the trial court’s award of $31.16 
million in actual damages to Carlton, as the fair market value of its interest 
in the Bulgaria Project at the time that Phillips and EurEnergy tortiously 
interfered with the CBM/Carlton agreement, is not so weak as to render the 
award clearly wrong and manifestly unjust.”184 The court held that the 
evidence was factually sufficient to support the trial court’s award to 
Carlton of $31.16 million in actual damages against Phillips and the Phillips 
entities. 
V. Marketing and Refining of Oil and Gas Production 
A. Court determines whether natural gas in storage constituted “goods, 
wares, and merchandise” for purposes of ad valorem tax exemption. 
The case of Missouri Gas Energy v. Grant County Assessor,185 the 
dispositive issue presented was “whether natural gas (‘gas’) in storage 
constitutes ‘goods, wares, and merchandise’ for purposes of the Freeport 
Exemption, Okla. Const. art. X, §6A; or, alternatively, whether the gas 
allocated to [Missouri Gas] for taxation purposes has a taxable situs in 
Oklahoma as required by 68 O.S. §2831.”186  
The appellant Missouri Gas Energy (MGE) is a local distribution 
company with its headquarters in Kansas City, Missouri. MGE purchases 
gas from suppliers and transports the gas via interstate pipeline for resale to 
its customers in Missouri. MGE entered into gas transportation and storage 
contracts with Southern Star, an interstate pipeline company based in 
Kentucky and regulated by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. 
Southern Star’s pipeline system extended across Texas, Oklahoma, Kansas, 
                                                                                                                 
 182. Id. The court drew an analogy to lottery tickets: “The prospect of winning millions 
in the lottery is too small to support any award of potential proceeds for, say, theft of a 
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 183. No. 01-09-00997-CV, 2016 WL 4536284 (Tex. App. Aug. 30, 2016). 
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 185. 376 P.3d 923 (Okla. Civ. App. 2016). 
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Missouri, Nebraska, Colorado and Wyoming. MGE purchases gas from 
suppliers and then nominates the purchased volumes of gas for receipt into 
the Southern Star pipeline system at various pooling points. Depending 
upon the type of nomination, made, Southern Star would either transport 
the gas to MGE‘s delivery points in Missouri, or would credit the gas to 
MGE’s system wide gas storage account. All of MGE’s gas is sold to 
customers in Missouri. MGE does not sell gas, and has no employees, in 
Oklahoma.187  
Southern Star also owns and operates 8 underground storage facilities 
connected to its pipeline. One such storage facility is located in Grant 
County, Oklahoma (the “Grant Facility”). MGE asserted that the gas 
injected at the Grant Facility enters the Southern Star pipeline system at 
meter points in Wyoming, Colorado, Kansas, Texas and Oklahoma. MGE 
contended that the gas stored at the Grant Facility did not all physically 
originate in Oklahoma. While Southern Star has possession of the gas in 
storage at the Grant Facility, title to the gas remained with its customers, 
including MGE. 
For ad valorem tax purposes, Southern Star allocates a volume of gas 
stored at the Grant Facility as of January 1 of each calendar year to each of 
its customers, including MGE. Copies of the allocations are provided to the 
Grant County Assessor who then assesses personal property ad valorem 
taxes against the allocated storage volumes. For tax year 2011, MGE 
received its Grant Facility allocation and timely filed a Freeport Exemption 
Declaration for the portion of the gas allocated to it which MGE claimed 
did not originate in Oklahoma. The Grant County Assessor and Board of 
Equalization each denied the claimed exemption. MGE filed an appeal to 
the district court arguing that the gas allocated to it which did not originate 
in Oklahoma did not have a taxable situs in Oklahoma as required by 68 
O.S. § 2831. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the 
Grant County Assessor and Board of Equalization. That court found that the 
Freeport Exemption188 did not apply to natural gas in storage “because it is 
not included in the category of ‘goods, wares and merchandise’ for 
purposes of the Freeport Exemption,”189 and the district court further found 
that the gas had a taxable situs in Oklahoma. MGE appealed. 
                                                                                                                 
 187. Id. 
 188. OKLA. CONST. ART. X, §6A. 
 189. Missouri Gas Energy, 376 P.3d at 925. 
http://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol2/iss5/3
2017]        Energy Litigation Update 2016 483 
 
 
In reversing in part and affirming in part the decisions below, some of 
the more notable rulings of the Oklahoma Court of Appeals were as 
follows: 
Under Oklahoma law, “[a]ll property in this state, whether real or 
personal, except that which is specifically exempt by law . . . shall be 
subject to ad valorem taxation. 68 O.S. §2804. Article X, §6A of the 
Oklahoma Constitution, commonly referred to as the ‘Freeport Exemption’ 
provides in part: 
provided, that goods, wares and merchandise, whether or not 
moving on through rates, shall be deemed to move in interstate 
commerce, and not subject to taxation in this State if not 
detained more than nine (9) months where such goods, wares 
and merchandise are so held for assembly, storage, 
manufacturing, processing or fabricating purposes . . .190 
After analyzing the wording of the exemption in depth, the court noted 
that during the pendency of the case, the Legislature changed the definition 
of personal property for purposes of ad valorem taxation through the 
enactment of House Bill 1962, 2015 Okla. Sess. Law Ch. 262, §1 (codified 
at 68 O.S. § 2807) (effective May 6, 2015). The Legislature provided that 
the amended wording—which was favorable to the position of MGE in this 
appeal—was to be given both retrospective and prospective effect. The 
court concluded that “natural gas severed from the realty qualifies as 
‘goods, wares, and merchandise’ for purposes of the Freeport Exemption.” 
The decision of the trial court was reversed and remanded on that issue.  
As to MGE’s argument that gas allocated to it which did not originate in 
Oklahoma could not have a taxable situs in the state as required by 68 O.S. 
§ 2831, the court found that the fact that the gas at issue here—which was 
stored at the Grant facility for approximately 9 months—had a taxable situs 
in Oklahoma regardless of where the gas originated. Thus, if the Freeport 
Exemption did not apply in this case, the gas would be taxable in 
Oklahoma. The court remanded the case to the trial court to determine the 
amount of gas which is exempt from ad valorem taxation due to the 
Freeport Exemption (i.e., to determine the amount of gas which MGE 
claims originated outside of Oklahoma, whether such gas was stored in 
Oklahoma for nine months or leass, and the amount of that gas which was 
shipped and sold outside of Oklahoma for Tax Year 2011).191 
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B. Debtor in bankruptcy is allowed to reject executory gas gathering 
contracts which were found to not be covenants running with the land. 
On March 8, 2016, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District 
of New York issued its initial highly controversial decision in In re: Sabine 
Oil & Gas Corporation,192 which allowed a debtor in bankruptcy to reject 
certain gas gathering contracts covering Texas oil and gas properties. That 
decision was followed by the Court’s further formal and binding ruling on 
May 3, 2016.193  
The court found that the gas gathering agreements did not convey an 
interest in real property, did not touch and concern real property, and did 
not run with the land under Texas law. Consequently, the debtor was 
allowed to reject the contracts so that it could replace the gathering 
agreements with new contracts containing commercial terms more 
favorable to the debtor.  
Since the time these decisions were issued, there has been a proliferation 
of writings and seminar talks devoted to the analysis and future import of 
the Sabine rulings. Accordingly, given the broader role of this paper and 
presentation as being one that focuses on the coverage of a variety of legal 
developments, the broader discussion and analysis of these highly 
publicized rulings will be left to the many commentaries that are available 
online.194 
C. District court adopts bankruptcy court’s proposed findings and 
conclusions in support of granting the downstream crude oil purchasers’ 
motion for summary judgment against lien claims and other assertions of 
the oil producers. 
In In re SemCrude, L.P.,195 the court was presented with a dispute 
between a group of oil producers (Producers) that had sold oil to the debtor 
in bankruptcy (SemCrude, L.P.) and two downstream purchasers, J. Aaron 
& Company and BP Oil Supply Company (Purchasers). The Purchasers 
filed adversary proceedings in SemCrude’s chapter 11 bankruptcy case 
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seeking declaratory relief with respect to both the Purchasers’ rights in 
certain disputed oil production and the Purchasers’ obligations, if any, to 
the Producers. Before the federal district court in this case were the 
bankruptcy court’s proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law 
(FFCL). The bankruptcy court recommended the granting of summary 
judgment in favor of the Purchase on all counts in their adversary 
complaints. The Producers filed objections to the proposed FFCL, and the 
Purchasers responded, such that the proposed FFCL were before the court 
in this cause for the entry of a final judgment. 
The factual backdrop for the claims involved the July 22, 2008, filing by 
SemCrude and related entities of voluntary petitions for relief under 
Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code. The Semcrude debtors 
provided midstream services in the oil and gas industry, “primarily 
aggregating oil and gas from producers and reselling the product to 
downstream purchasers.”196 J. Aron & Company was “a commodities 
trading company that not only purchased physical oil from the Debtors, but 
also traded financial derivatives with them.”197 For purposes of the disputes 
presented in this case, the court found that BP Oil Supply Company’s 
“relationship with the Debtors was functionally equivalent to that of J. 
Aron’s.”198  
At the time the SemCrude debtors filed bankruptcy, “they had not yet 
paid the Producers for oil they purchased on credit in June and July of 
2008.”199 Thousands of oil producers filed claims in the SemCrude 
bankruptcy proceedings with respect to the oil they delivered, but were not 
paid for, during the 51 days prior to the bankruptcy filing. The Producers 
also asserted claims against the Purchasers who had received the oil 
delivered to SemCrude by the Producers during the 51-day period for which 
no payment had ever been made to the Producers. The Purchasers filed 
adversary proceedings seeking, among other relief, a declaratory judgment 
that the Purchasers’ proposed tender of some $122 million (proposed to be 
the final net amount they owed the SemCrude debtors under their 
agreements) “fully satisfied and released the Purchasers from any claims of 
the Debtors and the Producers in the disputed oil.”200 
On June 28, 2013, the bankruptcy court issued its proposed FFCL and 
recommended the granting of summary judgment in favor of the 
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Purchasers. The Producers objected to many of the findings proposed by the 
bankruptcy court. In this phase of the litigation, the federal district court 
reviewed the proposed findings and the Producers’ objections. Among the 
many issues addressed by the Court, several of the more interesting findings 
included the following: 
With regard to the Purchasers’ objection to the bankruptcy court’s 
proposed finding “that the Purchasers took the disputed oil free and clear of 
all liens as buyers for value (BFV) under § 9-317 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code,”201 the district court first considered the proposed 
finding that the Producers’ purported lien rights were unperfected. The 
court noted that “certain U.C.C. provisions specific to Kansas and Texas 
provide [Producers] with automatically perfected liens in the oil they 
delivered to the Debtors.”202 However, the court concluded that the varying 
perfection laws among the states did not make a difference because, under 
Delaware law (the state of formation of the debtors), “the jurisdiction in 
which a debtor is located governs the issue of perfection.”203 From that 
finding, the court concluded that the Producers could not take advantage of 
the automatic perfection provisions of certain other states.  
The Producers also challenged the bankruptcy court’s recommendation 
that the court find, as to the BFV defense, that the Purchasers did not take 
the oil with actual knowledge of the Producers’ liens. The Producers 
alleged that the following circumstantial evidence created disputed issues of 
fact as to this defense: 
(a) the Purchasers knew that the Debtors purchased oil in 
Kansas, Texas, and Oklahoma; (b) the Purchasers knew the 
identities of some of the specific Producers; (c) the Purchasers 
knew that the laws of certain producer states automatically 
encumbered the proceeds of oil sales; and (d) the Purchasers 
knew that Debtors did not pay for the oil [but instead purchased 
the oil on credit].204 
The court found that the Producers’ contention that the Purchasers had 
actual knowledge of their liens “rests solely upon general knowledge of the 
industry; knowledge of the parties, knowledge of those parties’ locations, 
and knowledge of the applicable laws.”205 The court found that this was 
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insufficient to establish the Purchasers’ actual knowledge of a lien under § 
1-202(b) of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). 
With respect to the bankruptcy court’s proposed finding that the 
Purchasers also acquired the Producers’ oil free and clear of any liens as 
buyers in the ordinary course of business (BIOC) under §9-320(a) of the 
UCC, the Producers asserted that the crude oil purchase contracts of J. Aron 
were with the parent entity SemGroup, rather than with SemCrude. The 
Producers asserted that a parent or holding company does not buy or sell oil 
in the ordinary course of business, so that the proposed finding of the court 
was in error. The district court stated that it  
“rejects this formalistic approach. . . [C]ontrary to the Producers’ 
suggestion, the ‘person’ who sells the goods in the ordinary 
course of business is not necessarily limited to the unitary legal 
entities that are parties to the transaction”206 
It added that SemGroup owned 99.5% of the equity in SemCrude and 
ultimately received the value of the crude oil sales at issue in this suit. 
Consequently, in spite of the formal legal distinction between the two 
entities, the UCC’s definition of “person” for purposes of the BIOC defense 
was found to be broad enough to encompass the SemGroup-SemCrude 
relationship. 
VI. Surface Use, Surface Damages, Oklahoma Surface Damages Act, 
Condemnation and Environmental Cases 
A. Seller of property seeks to rescind the transaction after learning that the 
buyer would be using the land for a disposal well. 
The case of Stinson Farm and Ranch, L.L.C. v. Overflow Energy, 
L.L.C.,207 involved a suit by the plaintiff-seller of land to obtain rescission 
of the sale and transfer documents based on the defendant-buyer’s alleged 
misrepresentation that it was buying the property for use as an equipment 
yard. Less than a year after the sale, the seller learned that the defendant 
had applied for a commercial disposal well permit several weeks after the 
closing of the sale.  
In rejecting the request for rescission based upon alleged fraud, the court 
ruled that the seller could not simply inquire in discussions with the buyer 
about the intended usage, even on more than one occasion, and then seek to 
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rely on the buyer’s response without seeking to protect the seller by 
affirmatively stating in the sale documents that the property would not be 
used for certain specified offensive purposes. The court further noted that 
there was no evidence that the buyer did not actually intend at the time of 
the earlier discussions to build an equipment yard on the property other than 
the fact that the buyer did not do so.  
B. Court holds that the “public purpose” requirement for the exercise of 
the right of condemnation does not require that the primary intended 
beneficiaries of the taking be residents of the state. 
The case of AEP Oklahoma Transmission Company, Inc. v. Wooten,208 
was an action by AEP to acquire by eminent domain an easement to 
construct and operate an interstate electric transmission line over the 
property of Wooten. In appealing the trial court’s judgment in favor of 
AEP, Wooten asserted that the “taking” in this was not shown by AEP to be 
necessary for a legitimate public purpose under Oklahoma law. In 
particular, the landowner argued that prior case law209 held that, in order for 
a public purpose to be involved, the primary intended beneficiary of the use 
of the property must be the Oklahoma public. Wooten asserted that AEP’s 
transmission line would primarily benefit residents of Texas.  
The court rejected that argument and found that there is no requirement 
that the primary intended beneficiaries be Oklahoma residents.210 
C. Court rejects claim that the well operator, for whom the electric utility 
company entered landowners’ property to lay an electrical line, was an 
“aider and abetter” of the utility company’s alleged trespass. 
The case of Buckles v. Triad Energy, Inc.,211 involved the construction 
by OG&E (an electric utility) of an electrical highline to supply electricity 
to a well operated by Triad. The plaintiff landowners objected to the fact 
that the electrical supply line ran across public right-of-way including their 
lands in Section 28 in order to supply electricity to a well in Section 22. The 
landowners did not sue the utility, OG&E. Instead, they sued the operator 
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Triad as an alleged aider and abetter of trespass in the construction of the 
line. Triad responded that it did not own, operate or maintain the supply 
line and did not construct it. Rather, Triad was merely a customer of 
OG&E, which had the right to use the right-of-way as a public utility.  
The court of appeals found that the legal authority relied upon by the 
landowner “provides no support for the proposition a customer of a public 
utility is liable as an aider and abettor simply by requesting the provision of 
electrical service by a public utility.”212 The court further rejected the 
landowner’s assertion that this case involved a “private use” for a single oil 
and gas well of the public’s right-of-way, noting that the undisputed 
evidence showed that the highline was not only allowed to, but actually did, 
provide service to more than one customer. The court of appeals affirmed 
the district court’s ruling in favor of the operator Triad, finding that the 
landowner had not stated a legally cognizable claim against Triad for aiding 
and abetting a trespass. 
D. Court addresses claims of error in the proceedings below under the 
Surface Damages Act. 
The court in Xanadu Exploration Co. v. Welch213 addressed claims under 
the Oklahoma Surface Damages Act.214 The court (1) found that the trial 
court did not err in instructing the appraisers to determine the diminished 
value of the entire tract owned by the landowners resulting from the drilling 
operations, as opposed to only the lands actually used and occupied, (2) 
agreed with the Operator that the appraisers’ report was flawed in that it did 
not describe the quantity, boundaries and value of the property entered on 
or to be utilized in the drilling operations, as required by 52 O.S. § 
318.5(C), and (3) ruled that the appraisers had “no authority to direct 
mitigation, but may award the cost to restore land to its former condition, 
with compensation for loss of use of it, only if this cost is less than the 
diminution in fair market value of the land.”215  
E. Appeal of rulings under Surface Damages Act was found to be 
premature. 
The case of Veteran Exploration & Production, LLC v. McCraw216 
involved the court’s careful review of the various steps to be followed by 
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the parties and the Court Clerk’s office in connection with a lawsuit under 
the Oklahoma Surface Damages Act. The court concluded that the 
incomplete proceedings below did not lead to a final order, so the appeal 
was dismissed as premature and the case was remanded for further 
proceedings. 
F. Court resolves dispute under agricultural surface lease as to the 
allocation of surface damages payments between lessor and agricultural 
tenant. 
The plaintiff in Hoffman v. Jones, as Co-Trustee of the Clyde Hansen 
Testamentary Trust217 entered into to a written lease with the Hansen Trust 
covering the use of the surface of certain lands for agricultural purposes. 
The lease provided that Hoffman was to receive a share of payments which 
the Hansen Trust was paid for damages caused by oil and gas exploration or 
by the placement of a pipeline on the leased property. After exploration 
activities were conducted, a pipeline was laid and the Trust received money 
from the exploration activities and pipeline installation. When a 
disagreement arose as to Hoffman’s entitlement to a share of the money, 
Hoffman sued the Trust claiming entitlement to 25% of $7,522.00 paid for 
seismic operations and 40% of $103,986.00 paid to the Trust in connection 
with a pipeline right-of-way across land covered by Hoffman’s lease. The 
trial court found that both Hoffman and the Trust had reached settlements 
and accepted payments from the pipeline company. On that basis, the court 
concluded that Hoffman was not entitled to any of the money the Trust 
received for the pipeline right-of-way. However, the trial court ruled that 
Hoffman was entitled to 25% of the $7,522.00 the Trust received in 
connection with the seismic operations.  
On appeal, the Trust asserted that the lease agreement only entitled 
Hoffman to receive 25% of any “damages” caused as the result of oil and 
gas exploration on the lease, and that the $7,522.00 was paid for the “right 
to conduct” seismic activities and not for any damages caused. However, 
the Court of Appeals noted that Hoffman testified at trial regarding the 
damages caused by the seismic operations, including the disturbance to his 
quiet enjoyment of the leasehold. That testimony was found to be 
competent evidence to support the trial court’s ruling on this claim, and the 
ruling was affirmed. 
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G. In a case of first impression, the Texas Supreme Court holds that Texas’ 
accommodation doctrine applies to the relationship between the owner of 
the severed groundwater estate and the surface estate. 
In Coyote Lake Ranch, LLC v. City of Lubbock,218 the plaintiff Ranch 
had previously deeded its groundwater to the City of Lubbock, reserving 
water for domestic use, ranching operations, oil and gas production, and 
agricultural irrigation. For irrigation, the deed allowed the Ranch to drill 
only one or two wells in each of 16 specified areas. The deed contained 
lengthy and detailed provisions regarding the City’s right to use the land. At 
the time of the litigation, 18 wells had been drilled on the Ranch for 
irrigation or domestic use, and the City had drilled 11 wells on the northern 
edge of the Ranch.  
In 2012, the City announced plans to increase water extraction efforts on 
the Ranch, possibly drilling as many as 20 test wells in the middle of the 
Ranch, followed by 60 additional wells spread across the Ranch. The Ranch 
objected that the proposed drilling program would increase erosion and 
injure the surface unnecessarily. The City argued that it was acting well 
within the broad rights granted by the Ranch in its deed of water rights. The 
Ranch sued to enjoin the City from proceeding.  
The Ranch pleaded in part that the City had a contractual and common 
law responsibility to sue only that amount of surface that was reasonably 
necessary to its operations, and that the City had a duty to conduct its 
operations with due regard for the rights of the surface owner. The City 
responded that it had full rights under its deed to pursue its plans and that 
the law imposed no duty on groundwater owners, as it does on mineral 
owners, to accommodate the surface owner.  
At the hearing on the Ranch’s request that the City be enjoined from 
proceeding, the Ranch presented testimony as to damage that would be 
caused by the City’s planned course of action and presented a proposed 
alternative plan for different well cites and fewer roads. The trial court 
granted the Ranch a temporary injunction. The City appealed. The Texas 
Court of Appeals found that the accommodation doctrine did not apply to 
groundwater interests and reversed the trial court’s grant of relief to the 
Ranch.  
In ruling in favor of the Ranch, t he Texas Supreme Court concluded that 
the City was in error in its contention that the deed provisions alone 
determined its rights to use the Ranch: 
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The accommodation doctrine, based on the principle that 
conflicting estates should act with due regard for each other’s 
rights, has provided a sound and workable basis for resolving 
conflicts between ownership interests. The paucity of reported 
cases applying the doctrine suggests that it is well-understood 
and not often disputed. We have applied the doctrine only when 
mineral interests are involved. But similarities between mineral 
and groundwater estates, as well as in their conflicts with surface 
estates, persuade us to extend the accommodation doctrine to 
groundwater interests.219 
Accordingly, we hold that the accommodation doctrine applies 
to resolve conflicts between a severed groundwater estate and 
the surface estate that are not governed by the express terms of 
the parties’ agreement. As stated in Merriman, the surface owner 
must prove that (1) the groundwater owner’s use of the surface 
completely precludes or substantially impairs the existing use, 
(2) the surface owner has no available, reasonable alternative to 
continue the existing use, and (3) given the particular 
circumstances, the groundwater owner has available reasonable, 
customary, and industry-accepted methods to access and produce 
the water and allow continuation of the surface owner’s existing 
use.220 
The Court of Appeals judgment reversing the temporary injunction and 
remanding the case for further proceedings was affirmed. 
VII. Litigation Involving International Energy and Resources and 
Operations 
A. Motion to dismiss suit filed in the U.S. courts between foreign 
governments, involving dispute over stored crude oil, is granted in part and 
denied in part. 
The case of Ministry of Oil of the Republic of Iraq v. 1,032,212 Barrels 
of Crude Oil Aboard the United Kalavrvta221 presented the court with “a 
dispute between Iraq and the Kurdistan region of Iraq as to the ownership 
of more than one million barrels of crude oil.”222 The oil had been held in 
                                                                                                                 
 219. Id. at 63. 
 220. Id. at 64-65. 
 221. No. G-14-249, 2015 WL 93900 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 7, 2015). 
 222. Id. at *1. 
http://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol2/iss5/3
2017]        Energy Litigation Update 2016 493 
 
 
storage aboard a tanker near the coast of Galveston, Texas since July 2014. 
The Ministry of Oil of the Republic of Iraq (MoO) filed a complaint asking 
the court to seize the oil from the tanker on the grounds that the oil was the 
property of Iraq and had been converted by the Ministry of Natural 
Resources of the Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq (KRG). The court 
granted a seizure order, and “a warrant issued to be executed once the 
tanker entered United States (‘U.S.’) waters.”223 The KRG moved the court 
to vacate the seizure order. The court dismissed the MoO’s action without 
prejudice, finding that it lacked jurisdiction, and vacated the seizure order. 
In response, the MoO filed its second amended complaint, and KRG filed 
another motion to dismiss which is the subject of the present decision of the 
court. 
In granting the motion to dismiss in part and denying it in part, the court 
ruled in primary part as follows: 
The court first considered the political question doctrine which “excludes 
from judicial review those controversies which revolve around policy 
choices and value determinations constitutionally committed for resolution 
to the halls of Congress or the confines of the Executive Branch.”224 It 
found that the claims presented in this suit “seek an interpretation of the 
text of the Iraqi Constitution and application of that interpretation to the 
facts of the case to determine if the oil was converted.”225 Those issues 
were found to involve classic judiciary functions rather than political 
questions, so the court denied the motion to dismiss the amended complaint 
based on the political question doctrine. 
The next issue considered by the court was whether the MoO’s claims 
should be dismissed under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 
(FSIA),226 which provides foreign states with immunity from suit in U.S. 
courts, subject to certain exceptions. Here, the exception alleged to apply to 
the actions of KRG was the commercial activities exception: 
The activity complained of is the taking of Iraqi oil for sale, 
there are specific allegations that it has been sold in the U.S., and 
the sale of oil in the U.S. creates a direct effect in the U.S.227 
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The court found that the commercial activities exception of the FSIA 
applies under the facts of this case and therefore denied KRG’s motion to 
dismiss under the FSIA. 
The court next found that admiralty jurisdiction did not exist, noting that 
the sale and conversion of oil can occur anywhere and does not traditionally 
occur only on the water. Thus, the motion to dismiss on the basis that the 
court lacked admiralty jurisdiction was granted. 
Finally, in assessing the act of state doctrine, the court recognized that 
this doctrine provides that “the courts of one country will not sit in 
judgment of the acts of another, done within its own territory.”228 However, 
in the present case, the government of Iraq itself sought out the United 
States courts, and it only brought suit in the U.S. after attempting without 
success to resolve the case in Iraqi courts. The court denied KRG’s motion 
to dismiss on the basis of the act of state doctrine. 
B. Court confirms the award of an International Court of Arbitration panel 
in a dispute among the participants in a joint venture involving the 
construction, ownership, supply and operations of crude oil refining 
facilities. 
The case of PDV Sweeny, Inc. v. ConocoPhillips Co.,229 presented a 
petition to vacate, and a cross-petition to confirm and enforce, an arbitration 
award issued by an International Court of Arbitration panel. The underlying 
facts involved a number of entities and “a complex web of agreements 
governing the supply and management of the oil refining operation”230 at 
issue in the arbitration. 
ConocoPhillips, PDVSA and their respective subsidiaries 
commenced a joint venture to design, construct, own, supply, 
and operate refining facilities within the broader confines of a 
large refining complex owned by ConocoPhillips in Texas . . . 
PDVSA and its affiliates supplied crude oil from Venezuela 
which was then processed by ConocoPhillips.231 
Through the venture, PDVSA benefited from the greater refining and 
operational expertise of ConocoPhillips, and ConocoPhillips “was able to 
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secure a long-term, low cost source of crude oil from Venezuela, which it 
was then able to convert into high-value end products.”232 
Among the many contracts that were a part of the venture and its 
operations, the agreement most directly at issue in the arbitration was a 
Transfer Agreement, governed by New York law, which restricted the 
manner in which the parties could transfer their interests in the joint 
venture. The Transfer Agreement included a Call Option which could be 
triggered if a PDVSA subsidiary failed to meet its obligation to supply 
crude oil under the parties’ supply contract, or failed to make payments due 
under a supplemental contract, and the failure(s) remained uncured for 90 
days. If the Call Option was exercised, the exercising party was allowed to 
acquire all of the joint venture interest of the other party. However, the 
exercise of the Call Option did not automatically trigger a dissolution of the 
crude oil supply agreements. Rather, PDVSA and its affiliates would still 
be required to supply Venezuelan crude oil to ConcoPhillips even if they no 
longer owned an interest in the joint venture. 
When the PDVSA parties curtailed their supply of crude oil in January 
2009, allegedly due to cutbacks in the production and export of crude oil 
from Venezuela, ConocoPhillips ultimately exercised the Call Option. To 
acquire the PDVSA share of the joint venture under the exercised option, 
ConocoPhillips was required to pay “eighty percent of the PDVSA parties’ 
capital contributions to the joint venture minus all capital distributions from 
the joint venture to the PDVSA parties.”233 Since the PDVSA parties had 
received capital distributions totaling over $1.1 billion, and had made 
capital contributions of only some $270 million, the option price formula 
resulted in a purchase price of zero dollars.234 Since the crude oil supply 
agreements remained in place, PDVSA and its affiliates resumed shipments 
of oil in October 2009. 
The PDVSA parties commenced arbitration under the ICC Rules of 
Arbitration in February 2010. Among multiple issues raised, the PDVSA 
parties “challenged the validity of the Call Option, alleging that it acted as 
an unenforceable penalty clause under New York contract law . . . because 
it resulted in a purchase price of zero dollars for their share of the joint 
venture,”235 which was estimated to have a value between $352 million and 
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$540 million.236 They asserted that the purpose of the Call Option was to 
compel their performance rather than provide ConocoPhillips with adequate 
damages. The arbitration Panel issued its Award, finding “that the Call 
Option was valid and enforceable under New York law and could not 
constitute an impermissible contractual penalty.”237 In the view of the 
Panel, the Call Option was a valid contract provision for the termination of 
the joint venture, and was not a liquidated damages or penalty clause. 
In the present federal district court proceedings, the PDVSA parties 
asked the court to vacate the portion of the Award described above on the 
grounds that it violated the public policy of New York and the United 
states. ConocoPhillips, in turn, asked the court to confirm and enforce the 
Award. The court first considered the two international conventions relating 
to the enforcement of arbitration awards of the type at issue in this case and 
concluded that it had jurisdiction over the matters presented. The court then 
analyzed the complex body of law that determines the legal standards to be 
applied to the requested relief. 
The court found that the PDVSA parties fundamentally asserted “that the 
Panel grossly misapplied well-established New York contract law regarding 
the enforceability of contract provisions operating as a penalty.”238 The 
Panel agreed with ConocoPhillips’ that a contract clause can only be 
considered to be an unenforceable penalty if it is also a liquidated damages 
clause. Since the Panel determined that the Call Option was a termination 
provision rather than a liquidated damages provision, it could not be an 
unenforceable penalty. The court noted that “neither party has introduced 
any legal authority that conclusively answers the question put before the 
Panel concerning whether the Call Option acted as a penalty.”239 However, 
applying the prescribed standard of review for the decision of the Panel, it 
concluded that the PDVSA parties failed to meet “their ‘burden of 
demonstrating the existence of a clearly governing legal principle and the 
arbitrator’s manifest disregard of such a principle.’”240 The court denied the 
PDVSA parties’ motion to vacate. 
Finally, the court addressed the cross-petition of ConocoPhillips seeking 
confirmation and enforcement of the award, which was governed by the 
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same two international conventions as the petition of the PDVSA parties. 
Applying the appropriate standard of review, the court found that, 
[t]he Panel’s alleged misapplication of New York contract law 
concerning unenforceable penalties does not violate the state or 
nation’s “most basic notions of morality of justice.” . . . 
“[E]rroneous legal reasoning or misapplication of law is 
generally not a violation of public policy within the meaning of 
the [Inter-American] Convention.”241 
Finding that the PDVSA parties failed to meet their burden of 
demonstrating that summary affirmance was not appropriate, the court 
confirmed, recognized and enforced the Panel’s Award. 
C. Court finds that Shell’s responses to inquiries from the U.S. Department 
of Justice regarding possible violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act by one of Shell’s contractors were absolutely privileged. 
The Texas Court of Appeals’ decision in Writt v. Shell Oil Co.,242 was 
discussed in the 2013 edition of this annual report. The issue in this case 
was whether the defendants had “an ‘absolute privilege,’ or ‘immunity,’ to 
make [alleged] defamatory statements about [Writt] to the United States 
Department of Justice (‘DOJ’).”243 In his employment with Shell, Writt 
was charged with the responsibility of approving payments to 
contractors on certain Shell projects in foreign countries, 
including Nigeria. During the course of his work, Writt learned 
that certain Shell contractors were under investigation “by 
various governmental agencies” for making and receiving illegal 
payments and one of Shell’s vendors had pleaded guilty to 
violating the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”).244 
Writt alleged that the defendants voluntarily submitted a report to the DOJ, 
in response to an informal inquiry, that  
falsely stated that he had been involved in illegal conduct in a 
Shell Nigerian project by recommending that Shell reimburse 
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contractor payments he knew to be bribes and by failing to report 
illegal contractor conduct of which he was aware.245  
The trial court granted the defendants’ motion for summary 
judgment and determined that the defendants had an absolute 
privilege and immunity with regard to the alleged defamatory 
statements at issue in this lawsuit. Writt appealed. 
In a lengthy split decision of the three-judge panel, the majority of the 
Texas Court of Appeals panel reversed the trial court’s decision and ruled 
that the statements of the defendants were not absolutely privileged, but 
were instead only conditionally privileged.246  
In further appellate proceedings, the Texas Supreme Court reversed the 
judgment of the court of appeals, concluding that “Shell’s statements were 
made preliminary to a proposed judicial proceeding and were absolutely 
privileged.”247 The court first noted that Texas law recognizes two classes 
of privileges applicable to defamation suits—absolute privilege and 
conditional or qualified privilege. While “[a]n absolute privilege is more 
properly thought of as an immunity,”248 the conditional or qualified 
privilege “is lost if abused, such as when the statement is made with malice 
and with knowledge of its falsity.”249 Important to the facts at issue in this 
case, the court found that: 
The fact that a formal proceeding does not eventually occur will 
not cause a communication to lose its absolutely privileged 
status; however, it remains that the possibility of a proceeding 
must have been a serious consideration at the time the 
communication was made.250 
The court also emphasized that Shell’s actions occurred in an atmosphere 
of growing enforcement actions by the DOJ. FCPA enforcement actions 
more than doubled over the year preceding the DOJ’s action in 2007 
informing Shell of its investigation. FCPA enforcement actions more than 
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doubled again from 2007 through 2010 when the DOJ and Shell entered 
into a Deferred Prosecution Agreement.251 Moreover, the court noted that 
both federal prosecutors and the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines “place a high 
premium on self-reporting, along with cooperation and remedial efforts, in 
determining the appropriate resolution of FCPA matter.”252 The court 
concluded: 
In sum, the summary judgment evidence is conclusive that when 
Shell provided its internal investigation report to the DOJ, Shell 
was a target of the DOJ’s investigation and the information in 
the report related to the DOJ’s inquiry. The evidence is also 
conclusive that when it provided the report, Shell acted with 
serious contemplation of the possibility that it might be 
prosecuted.253 
Finding that the actions of Shell in providing its internal report to the 
DOJ was an absolutely privileged communication, the court reversed the 
judgment of the court of appeals and reinstated the judgment of the trial 
court in favor of Shell. 
It bears noting that six former United States Attorneys General (Michael 
B. Mukasey, Benjamin R. Civiletti, Edwin Meese, III, Richard L. 
Thornburgh, William P. Barr and Alberto R. Gonzales) submitted an 
amicus curiae letter in support of Shell. The United States Chamber of 
Commerce, the National Association of Manufacturers and the American 
Petroleum Institute submitted an amicus brief in support of Shell.254 
D. Series of lawsuits involving international companies and operations 
tested the limits of finding jurisdiction in the United States courts. 
In International Energy Ventures Management, L.L.C. v. United Energy 
Group, Limited,255 the plaintiff (IEVM) appealed the district court’s 
dismissal of this lawsuit against the defendant UEG for lack of personal 
jurisdiction. The underlying facts in the case involved the announcement in 
July 2010 that “British Petroleum (‘BP’) . . . that it wished to sell its 
Pakistani subsidiaries that owned oil and gas fields in Pakistan.”256 IEVM 
made a presentation regarding BP’s Pakistani assets to UEG, a Chinese oil 
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and gas company located in Beijing. Under a compensation agreement 
agreed to by UEG and IEVM, “IEVM was to assist UEG in its technical 
evaluation and in sourcing financing and act as consultants on behalf of 
UEG for the acquisition of the BP Pakistan Assets.”257 IEVM later learned 
that BP had sold the Pakistan assets to UEG.  
When UEG repeatedly declined to pay the compensation that IEVM 
contended was due it under the Compensation Agreement, IEVM sued 
UEG for breach of contract, promissory estoppel, quantum meruit and 
fraud. “[F]ollowing the removal of this case to federal court, UEG moved to 
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.”258 The district court granted that 
motion. IEVM appealed.  
In order to determine whether IEVM had shown that the court had 
specific jurisdiction over UEG, the court examine “the pre-litigation 
contacts that UEG purposefully established with the state of Texas:”259 
UEG sent a letter of interest, negotiated with, and sent a bid to 
BP’s Houston office, the hub of the BP deal, in an attempt to 
secure the BP Pakistan Assets. UEG retained Mueller, a Texas 
resident, as one of its two principal contacts on the BP deal. 
UEG contracted with Texas-based IEVM to perform consulting 
work on the BP deal and sent payment to IEVM in Texas. UEG 
contracted with the Houston offices of Dewey & LeBoeuf 
(attorneys), Degolyer & McNaughton (consultants), and Ernst & 
Young (accountants) to advise it on the BP deal. UEG’s Chief 
Financial Officer travelled to Houston to sign the deal and to 
attend a dinner celebration.260 
The court concluded that IEVM met its prima facie burden of showing 
specific jurisdiction. The court reversed the district court’s dismissal of 
UEG from the lawsuit because the court had personal jurisdiction over 
UEG. 
In Brenham Oil & Gas, Inc. v. TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Company,261 
Brenham sued TGS and ENI, S.p.A. alleging that Brenham’s efforts to 
reach an oil production agreement with the Republic of Togo failed due to 
the tortious interference of TGS. TGS was “a company that gathers and 
markets seismic data for the hydrocarbon industry. ENI, an Italian 
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company, was accused of aiding and encouraging TGS’s tortious 
conduct.”262 The trial granted ENI’s special appearance and dismissed ENI 
from the lawsuit based on the lack of personal jurisdiction over ENI. 
Brenham appealed. 
In a lengthy opinion that describes the facts in great detail, the Texas 
Court of Appeals summarized the facts alleged by Brenham to support 
general jurisdiction in Texas: 
Brenham Oil notes evidence of a trip by ENI executives to an 
industry conference in Houston where they met with 
representatives of several oil companies, as well as two trips by 
ENI’s CEO to Texas for business meetings and speaking 
engagements. Brenham further observes that on 39 occasions 
between 2009 and 2012, other ENI employees visited Texas on 
business trips for the company, as evidenced by numerous letters 
of invitation from Texas subsidiary ENI U.S. Operating Co. to 
the American consulate in Milan. The stated purpose of these 
visits generally was to work with or advise ENTs Texas 
subsidiaries. Finally, Brenham points to evidence that ENI 
assumed an active role in negotiating a lease of Houston office 
space on behalf of ENI U.S. Operating Co. ENI employees 
traveled to Houston to survey the property and offer support in 
making the new offices match the “ENI standard.”263 
In pointing to the above activities of ENI on behalf of its subsidiaries as a 
basis for general jurisdiction, Brenham did not deny that the subsidiaries 
were separate corporate entities. The court concluded that ENI’s contacts 
with Texas were not shown to be sufficiently continuous and systematic to 
render ENI essentially at home in Texas, and that Brenham failed to show 
that ENI is subject to general jurisdiction in Texas.264 
The court also found that, because Brenham Oil’s claims against ENI do 
not arise from the alleged forum contacts, the trial court did not err in 
dismissing Brenham’s claims based on the additional finding of a lack of 
specific jurisdiction.265  
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VIII. Other Energy Industry Cases 
A. Court addresses attempt by party to use pretrial discovery procedures as 
a means of obtaining commercial data that was sought as part of the 
ultimate relief requested in the lawsuit. 
In Ring Energy, Inc. v. Hullum,266 the court was presented with a 
discovery dispute involving the Hullum defendants’ attempt to use pretrial 
discovery procedures to obtain access to geophysical exploration data that 
was also sought by the defendants as part of the ultimate relief requested by 
them in the lawsuit. The plaintiff Ring Energy and the Hullum defendants 
had entered into a merger agreement under which the defendants agreed to 
assign certain oil and gas leases to Ring in exchange for cash and stock in 
Ring Energy. Ring subsequently brought suit alleging that the defendants 
failed to meet their obligation to assign the oil and gas leases. The 
defendants denied those allegations and asserted counterclaims for breach 
of contract, specific performance and other related claims. Part of the basis 
for the counterclaims was the assertion that the merger agreement required 
Ring to provide the defendants with seismic reports and other information 
related to the leases, and that the information had not been provided. 
The defendants sought to obtain the seismic reports both through 
discovery directed to Ring and through a non-party subpoena duces tecum 
directed to “the professional geologist commissioned by Ring to obtain 
seismic data and create the seismic reports.”267 Ring opposed both attempts 
to obtain the geophysical testing information through discovery. In 
response, the defendants argued that the information was relevant to various 
claims and defenses that would be presented at the trial of the action, and 
that Ring would have an unfair advantage in various ways if it, alone, had 
access to the reports during the pendency of the lawsuit. 
With regard to the argument of Ring that to allow the defendants to 
obtain copies of the geophysical information through discovery would 
essentially grant the defendants part of the ultimate relief sought through 
their specific performance counterclaim, the court observed that 
[i]t is difficult to find cases in which a party seeks, as part of the 
ultimate relief, the disclosure of information and then seeks that 
same information through discovery. Cases in which this 
situation has arisen include those lawsuits arising out of Freedom 
of Information Act (FOIA) requests. In this context, the United 
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States Supreme Court has addressed whether discovery requests 
which, if answered, would provide all of the relief the requesting 
party could obtain if that party were to prevail on the merits are 
appropriate.268 
The court noted that the Supreme Court has concluded, in the context of 
FOIA litigation, that such discovery requests should not be allowed.269 
However the court in the present lawsuit distinguished those decisions on 
the ground that providing the Hullum defendants with the seismic reports 
would not provide them with all of the relief they would obtain if successful 
in this suit on the claim for specific performance, provided that an 
appropriate protective order is entered. The court also concluded that the 
seismic reports were “necessary in order for defendants to establish a 
number of their claims.”270  
While the court found that Ring had shown “good cause for limiting the 
use of the seismic reports in order to prevent defendants from prevailing 
prematurely on much of their specific performance claim,”271 it concluded 
that the seismic reports could be obtained through discovery subject to 
stated limitations. The court directed that the defendants could not use the 
reports for any purposes other than the lawsuit, and it prohibited the use of 
the reports to negotiate renewals or extensions of oil and gas leases. It noted 
that this limitation might prevent the defendants from mitigating their 
damages if they ultimately prevail in the lawsuit, leading to a potential 
increase in the monetary damages recovered from Ring in that instance. 
However, the court found that Ring had chosen to take that risk given its 
objections to the defendants being allowed to fully use the information 
during the pendency of the litigation.272 
B. As a matter of first impression, the Tenth Circuit holds that, for purposes 
of diversity jurisdiction in the federal courts, the citizenship of a master 
limited partnership consists of unitholders’ citizenship. 
The case of Grynberg v. Kinder Morgan Energy Partners, L.P.,273 
involved a lawsuit in which the plaintiffs (Grynbergs) petitioned the federal 
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district court to vacate an arbitration award entered against them and in 
favor of Kinder Morgan Energy Partners, L.P. (KMEP) and Kinder Morgan 
CO2 Company, L.P. The Grynbergs sued in federal court on the basis of 
diversity jurisdiction. At the time the lawsuit was filed, the Grynbergs were 
Colorado citizens. KMEP was a Delaware master limited partnership. The 
district court dismissed the Grynbergs’ lawsuit for lack of jurisdiction. 
It concluded that under Carden v. Arkoma Associates, 494 U.S. 
185, 195, 110 S.Ct. 1015, 108 L.Ed.2d 157 (1990), KMEP’s 
citizenship was the citizenship of all its unitholders, and because 
KMEP had at least one Colorado unitholder, its citizenship was 
not completely diverse from the Grynbergs’.274 
The Grynbergs appealed. 
As a matter of first impression, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district 
court’s dismissal of the lawsuit and held that the citizenship of a master 
limited partnership consists of its unitholders’ citizenship.275 The court 
reached this conclusion finding that (a) the long-standing rule for 
determining citizenship of unincorporated entities (i.e., that citizenship is 
typically determined by the entity’s members’ citizenship) applies to master 
limited partnerships, (b) the narrow exception to that rule, which applies to 
corporations, does not apply here, and (c) the Grynbergs’ policy arguments 
in favor of expanding the exception to master limited partnerships are better 
addressed to the Congress than the courts.276 
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